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89No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lyingPhilosophical Psychology 30 (4): 438-457. 2017.According to the traditional definition of lying, somebody lies if he or she makes a believed-false statement with the intention to deceive. The traditional definition has recently been challenged by non-deceptionists who use bald-faced lies to underpin their view that the intention to deceive is no necessary condition for lying. We conducted two experiments to test whether their assertions are true. First, we presented one of five scenarios that consisted of three different kinds of lies. Then …Read more
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128Order effects in moral judgmentPhilosophical Psychology 25 (6): 813-836. 2012.Explaining moral intuitions is one of the hot topics of recent cognitive science. In the present article we focus on a factor that attracted surprisingly little attention so far, namely the temporal order in which moral scenarios are presented. We argue that previous research points to a systematic pattern of order effects that has been overlooked until now: only judgments of actions that are normally regarded as morally acceptable are susceptible to be affected by the order of presentation, and…Read more
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21A double causal contrast theory of moral intuitions in trolley dilemmasIn S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society. pp. 2589--2594. 2010.
Göttingen, Lower Saxony, Germany
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |