Cornelis de Waal

Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, is a hugely important and influential thinker in the history of American philosophy. His philosophical interests were broad and he made significant contributions in several different areas of thought. Moreover, his contributions are intimately connected and his philosophy designed to form a coherent and systematic whole. Contents: 1: Life and Work; Chapter 2: Logic; Chapter 3: The Doctrine of the Categories; Chapter 4: Semiotics; Chapter 5: Philosophy of Science; Chapter 6: Pragmatism but Not Practicalism; Chapter 7: A Pragmatist Theory of Truth; Chapter 8: The Perpetual Fight against Nominalism; Chapter 9: The Impact of Darwin; Chapter 10: Mathematics; Chapter 11: Mind and Self; Chapter 12 (Conclusion): The Architectonic Philosopher; Bibliography; Notes; Index.

Sixteen original essays from outstanding international contributors together with responses from Haack on the points raised. The contributors address most of Haack’s key publications, from her early writings on metaphysics to her most recent work in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of law. Topics include: the revisability of logic, the role of emotion in reasoning, scientific integrity, postmodernism and the law, the relation of science to religion, preferential hiring, multiple aspects of Haack’s "foundherentism," and her crossword analogy. The volume also includes an extensive interview with Haack, which traces the development of her thought, and a complete bibliography of her work. For anyone seeking a better understanding of the work of this important philosopher, this unique collection offers many invaluable insights.

Cheryl Misak’s Cambridge Pragmatism is a key work for anyone who seeks to gain a deeper understanding of twentieth-century philosophy, especially during its first half. It is commonly assumed that pragmatism petered out in the early part of the century, only to resurface in the 1970s, most notably with the work of Richard Rorty. Much of what inspired this assumption was that most major figures were keen to distance themselves from a movement that named itself pragmatism. To many, it suggested that we should give up on getting things right and focus instead on practical concerns. This view was fueled in part by James’s powerful statement that truth is the cash value of our ideas, which was interpreted...

This brief text assists students in understanding Peirce's philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series, (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), On Peirce is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher, better enabling students to engage in reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 ed. by Francesco BellucciCornelis de WaalEdited by Francesco BellucciCharles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020; no index.With Francesco Bellucci's Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 and the Peirceana series, which Bellucci co-edits with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, the center of gravity in Peirce studies has dramatically shifted to Europe. The powerhouses of old, such as the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University and the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism at Texas Tech University, appear pretty much dead in the water. And this new center of gravity is by no means limited to secondary literature. Bellucci's edition of Peirce's writings on semiotics and Pietarinen's multi-volume Logic of the Future present us with well-thought-out and responsibly edited volumes of primary literature that will leave their mark on Peirce scholarship for decades to come. And there are other volumes on the way.Bellucci's volume spans almost two decades of Peirce's life—a period during which Peirce had retreated to Milford, Pennsylvania, spending most of his time with his pen on paper. The main purpose of Bellucci's volume is to give us better access to material that has not yet been published—material that is, as Bellucci contends, "essential to understand Peirce's views about signs, their classification, and the relations between semiotics and logical inquiry" (p.1).In line with this, Bellucci starts off where the Writings break off. The last volume of the Writings, which appeared well over a decade ago, ends midway 1892, and Bellucci's volume opens with the sixth chapter of Peirce's 1894 logic book How to Reason, "The Essence of Reasoning." Bellucci thereby skips the second chapter of that same logic book, even though it deals directly with the question "What is a Sign?" He does this on the ground that that chapter is already published in the second [End Page 265] volume of The Essential Peirce (p.3). Bellucci's Selected Writings on Semiotics is thus best considered a professional tool aimed at filling gaps in the literature for Peirce scholars who are already familiar with, or knowledgeable of, what is already out there. Making these texts available is especially important since the manuscripts they are based on are not widely accessible and are in various states of disarray.Each text in Bellucci's volume comes with a (sometimes-extensive) editorial note that is largely bibliographical and, like the Writings, explains which manuscript sheets constitute the text by supplementing the Robin Catalogue designation with the page reference system devised by the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism. The headnote is followed by explanatory annotations, emendations, and alterations, not unlike the system used for the Writings. In this way the reader can easily ascertain where Bellucci made corrections to the original text and what changes Peirce made himself when he was in the process of writing. Putting the apparatus immediately following each text is a much better choice than hiding everything in the back of the volume, as was done in the Writings. Given the nature of this edition, however, it would have been better to have the editorial note precede the text, as is done, for instance in The Essential Peirce, rather than follow it (or use two notes), as that would have made it easier for the reader to position the text within Peirce's oeuvre before beginning to read it (for instance, by reading "What is a Sign?" before starting "The Essence of Reasoning").Bellucci's Selected Writings on Semiotics includes eighteen selections in total, each of which is described briefly in the volume's Introduction with a rationale for including it. As with the Writings, titles not given by Peirce are printed in italic square brackets. At times a more forceful editorial hand in establishing the titles themselves would have been helpful. Selection 10, for instance, "The Basis of Pragmaticism," suggests that it would include two pieces already found in The Essential Peirce, namely "The Basis of Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy," and "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. RobinsonCornelis de WaalEdited by Stetson J. RobinsonThe Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. 666pp., incl. indexThe fifth volume in the Peirceana series brings us the extensive correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company (abbreviated to OCP by Robinson). The double-barreled opening shot consists of two letters (one by Francis Russell and one by Open Court’s Editor Paul Carus) aimed at soliciting a contribution from [End Page 109] Peirce for the inaugural issue of a new quarterly journal to be published by the Open Court, called The Monist. Carus had been particularly impressed by Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science papers, which had appeared over a decade earlier in Popular Science Monthly, and to which Russell had drawn Carus’s attention.1 Peirce quickly responded, suggesting not one but an entire series of articles, the first of which to be titled “The Architecture of Theories.” It proved the beginning of a productive but also turbulent relationship between Peirce and the publishing company. The final letter in the exchange comes again from Carus, written September 10, 1913, about seven months before Peirce died.The Open Court Collection at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, from which much of the correspondence is drawn, is a truly magnificent collection. It contains not only business correspondence and financial records, but also the various stages of the publishing process. It includes the original texts that Peirce sent to the publisher, as well as the often heavily corrected galleys and proofs—material that is used appreciatively by the Peirce Edition Project for its critical edition of Peirce’s Writings. When we combine this record with the Nachlass of a philosopher who lived in a continuously expanding mansion with a penchant for keeping each and every scrap of paper, we get a remarkably full picture of everything that went into the publication of Peirce’s work with the Open Court. In contrast, we know painfully little of what went on at the Century Company, which published the Century Dictionary to which Peirce so heavily contributed, or of James Mark Baldwin’s treatment of Peirce’s submissions when he compiled his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Neither venture seems to have left any records, apart from what survived within Peirce’s own papers— at least no such records have so far been found. We know a bit more about Peirce’s dealings with The Nation, but again, almost exclusively because of what has been preserved in Peirce’s papers.Robinson’s hefty tome makes the correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court widely available for the first time. The book opens with a short explanation of the editorial method, a helpful chronology, and a brief historical introduction describing Peirce’s relationship with the Open Court. The work also contains fourteen illustrations, mostly of letters. The introduction to the volume is brief and largely piggybacks on a handful of sources, such as the Introduction to Volume 8 of the Writings, rather than that it was inspired by the collection of letters that follows it, or by a closer familiarity with the archival holdings of the Open Court.2 In his introduction, Robinson divides Peirce’s relationship with the publishing company in four periods: A very active 1890–1894, which includes Peirce’s familiar Monist Metaphysical papers, his contributions to the fortnightly The Open Court, and his [End Page 110] attempts at writing an elementary arithmetic. This period ends with a falling out between Peirce and Hegeler. It is followed by a far more subdued 1894–1897, where the relationship with the publisher is largely restored by Russell, and which results in an extensive discussion by Peirce of the third volume of Ernst Schröder’s Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, which appeared in two parts in The Monist. This period too ends with a falling out. The activity picks up again in 1904, resulting in Peirce’s famous pragmatism papers as well as the “Some Amazing Mazes” series of 1908...

This brief text assists students in understanding Mead's philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series, (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), ON MEAD is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher, better enabling students to engage in reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper.

The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce brings together 35 essays on the American philosopher and polymath Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) with the aim of showing how his work is still relevant today. The volume takes its cues from Peirce's work in phenomenology and normative philosophy-where the latter includes, besides aesthetics and ethics, also logic. Within the domain of logic, attention is given to his work in formal logic as well as his work in graphical or diagrammatic logic. Ample attention is given also to Peirce's pragmatism and his metaphysics. The volume further includes biographical papers as well as papers on abduction, semiotics, linguistics, physics, biology, religion, history, science, and education.

In this volume comprised of sixteen essays and rebuttals, author and professor of philosophy Susan Haack responds to her fellow philosophers and her critics on a wide range of topics that involve much more than the esoteric nature of contemporary philosophy. Instead, as is Haack's forte, she asserts her views on important current issues such as how scientists conduct their work, the ethics of affirmative action and the pitfalls of preferential hiring, and how the distorted reality the postmodern thinkers have presented has corrupted legal thinking. Her charge is to bring clarity, precision, integrity, and most of all, practicality to her field of study.

This article focuses on George Herbert Mead's life and his philosophy of the act. Mead divides the act into four stages: impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. The impulse sets the organism in motion, whereas consummation marks the satisfaction of the desire that initiated the act. Hence, consummation brings the act to a close. This should not be taken as a linear chain of responses to neatly self-contained problematic situations. Organisms often multitask, and problematic situations are typically nested, as when an animal in its search for food is being attacked by a predator.

Locke's, Berkeley's and Peirce's conceptions of reality are analyzed, using Peirce's distinction between nominalism and realism as a guideline. These three authors are chosen, first, because Peirce declares for realism in his 1871 review of Berkeley, and does so in opposition to both Berkeley and Locke, and, second, because Peirce's criticism of nominalism runs roughly parallel to Berkeley's criticism of Locke. It is shown that all three conceptions of reality are hypotheses, which provides the criteria to compare and evaluate them: the hypothesis must be either required, or at least valuable, for explaining the origin and regularities of those ideas that are not of our own making. This leads to the following result: Locke's conception of reality also fails on both counts. Berkeley's alternative, though also not required, is explanatorily valuable, but as it appears, this results entirely from a strong presupposition that does all the explaining for him. It is further shown that his approach is based on a denial of matter that is untenable, and that it ultimately fails for the same reasons as Locke's. Peirce' s view of reality as the object of a final opinion, though not required either, can be defended as being explanatorily valuable, but needs some modification, since some things will be real but not part of the final opinion. This leads to a new conception of reality, called the hypothesis of hypothetical realism, by way of a conclusion. This hypothesis has the desired explanatory value, and is safe from the criticisms raised against the previous conceptions