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108Color and the duplication assumptionSynthese 129 (1): 61-77. 2001.Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assu…Read more
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264A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan HurleyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 3 455-458. 1999.Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in w…Read more
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Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ÔÇÿcorporalityÔÇÖ and ÔÇÿalerting capacityÔÇÖPhenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 4 (4): 369. 2005.
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Holism, functionalism and visual awarenessCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1): 3-19. 1998.
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50Direct self-consciousness (review)Psycoloquy. 2000.One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view
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44An account of color without a subject?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 42-43. 2003.While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Computing and Information |
General Philosophy of Science |