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47Getting real about experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6): 801-802. 2004.The idea that experience is essentially subjective rather than of the real world is paradoxical and deeply flawed. The external world is, much more than a mere constraint, essential to meaningfully describe experience and neural activity. This is illustrated by an analysis of the phenomenology of veridical perception and by the study of experience in psychopathology by the Experience Sampling Method (ESM).
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35Constrained Inversions of SensationsPhilosophica 68 (2). 2001.Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments …Read more
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52The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mindIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 391-408. 2015.
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66The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colorsPhilosophical Psychology (3): 1-17. 2013.Color experience is structured. Some ?unique? colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as ?pure,? or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as ?binary colors.? According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds …Read more
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The matter of the mind. Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (review)Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (2): 157-159. 2009.
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Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Quining kinds of content: The primacy of experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 72-77. 2004.
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108Color and the duplication assumptionSynthese 129 (1): 61-77. 2001.Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assu…Read more
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Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ÔÇÿcorporalityÔÇÖ and ÔÇÿalerting capacityÔÇÖPhenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 4 (4): 369. 2005.
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264A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan HurleyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 3 455-458. 1999.Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in w…Read more
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Holism, functionalism and visual awarenessCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1): 3-19. 1998.
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49Direct self-consciousness (review)Psycoloquy. 2000.One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view
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44An account of color without a subject?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 42-43. 2003.While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.
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22Two sciences of perception and visual art: editorial introduction to the Brussels PapersJournal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9): 8-9. 2000.Two kinds of vision science are distinguished: a representational versus a nonrepresentational one. Seeing in the former is conceived of as creating an internal replica of the external world, while in the latter seeing is taken to be a process of active engagement with the environment. The potential of each theory for elucidating artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation is considered, necessarily involving some comments on visual consciousness. This discussion is intended as a background aga…Read more
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5Quining kinds of content: The primacy of experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 72-76. 2004.
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48Could dancing be coupled oscillation? – The interactive approach to linguistic communication and dynamical systems theoryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5): 634-635. 2002.Although we applaud the interactivist approach to language and communication taken in the target article, we notice that Shanker & King (S&K) give little attention to the theoretical frameworks developed by dynamical system theorists. We point out how the dynamical idea of causality, viewed as multidirectional across multiple scales of organization, could further strengthen the position taken in the target article.
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101Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness"In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2001.In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes
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1158Is Trilled Smell Possible? How the Structure of Olfaction Determines the Phenomenology of SmellJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12): 59-95. 2011.Smell 'sensations' are among the most mysterious of conscious experiences, and have been cited in defense of the thesis that the character of perceptual experience is independent of the physical events that seem to give rise to it. Here we review the scientific literature on olfaction, and we argue that olfaction has a distinctive profile in relation to the other modalities, on four counts: in the physical nature of the stimulus, in the sensorimotor interactions that characterize its use, in the…Read more
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53In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the problem of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes?behavioral, neural, computational?can produce experience. Numerous thinkers have argued that phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in functional, neural or information-processing terms (e.g. Block 1990, 1994; Chalmers 1996). Different arguments have been put forward. For example, it has been argued that t…Read more
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Is bewustzijn louter representatie?Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 2 157-159. 2005.
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24Editorial introductionSynthese 129 (1): 1-2. 2001.Music raises many problems for those who would understand it more deeply. It is rooted in time, yet timeless. It is pure form, yet conveys emotion. It is written, but performed, interpreted, improvised, transcribed, recorded, sampled, remixed, revised, rebroadcast, reinterpreted, and more. Music can be studied by philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, mathematicians, biologists, computer scientists, neuro-scientists, critics, politicians, promoters, and of course musicians. Moreover, no sing…Read more
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Uitgebreid, complementair, of omvattend? Het waar en het hoe van het mentaleAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3). 2012.
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21Fragmentation, coherence, and the perception/action divideBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2): 231-231. 2001.I discuss Stoffregen & Bardy's theory from the perspective of the complementary aspect of input conflict, namely, imput coherence - the unity of perception. In a classical approach this leads to the famous The conceptual framework the authors construct leaves no space for a binding problem to arise. A remaining problem of perceptual conflict, arising in cases of inversion of the visual field can be handled by the theory the authors propose
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32Constrained inversions of sensationsPhilosophica (Belgium) 68 (2): 31-40. 2001.Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments …Read more
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73Las meninas and the illusion of illusionismJournal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9): 124-130. 2008.There is a popular view on depiction which holds that convincingly realistic paintings depict their subjects through evoking in the spectator the illusion of seeing these very subjects face to face. There is, as it were, an exact 'match' between the visual experience of seeing something in a picture and the corresponding visual experience one would entertain if one were to stand in front of the real thing. This view, which we shall call 'illusionism', supports the widespread assumption that some…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Computing and Information |
General Philosophy of Science |