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36Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 520-521. 2007.The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man…Read more
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274Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4): 369-387. 2005.How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other men…Read more
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47Getting real about experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6): 801-802. 2004.The idea that experience is essentially subjective rather than of the real world is paradoxical and deeply flawed. The external world is, much more than a mere constraint, essential to meaningfully describe experience and neural activity. This is illustrated by an analysis of the phenomenology of veridical perception and by the study of experience in psychopathology by the Experience Sampling Method (ESM).
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35Constrained Inversions of SensationsPhilosophica 68 (2). 2001.Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments …Read more
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66The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colorsPhilosophical Psychology (3): 1-17. 2013.Color experience is structured. Some ?unique? colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as ?pure,? or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as ?binary colors.? According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds …Read more
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52The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mindIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 391-408. 2015.
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The matter of the mind. Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (review)Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (2): 157-159. 2009.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Computing and Information |
General Philosophy of Science |