Steven Nadler

One of the welcome features of Leibniz research over the past quarter century has been the abandonment of the old "chicken vs. egg" debate about whether Leibniz's logic precedes and grounds his metaphysics or vice versa. Scholars such as Robert M. Adams, Daniel Garber, and Donald Rutherford, among others, have brought our attention to what might be called the systematic "holism" of Leibniz's thought and the way in which its various elements—logical, physical, metaphysical, and theological—reinforce each other. Rutherford, in particular, has argued persuasively that if anything is central to Leibniz's project and its systematicity, it is his philosophical theology, and especially his theodicy.Paul Rateau's book is an important contribution to our understanding of Leibniz's thinking about the problem of evil and the way in which it relates to so many other aspects—philosophical, political, theological—of his system. It is, without question, the most thorough, careful, and philosophically astute study to date of Leibniz's theodicy and its ramifications. It is also an exceedingly well-written and fascinating book

In this paper, I argue that Arnauld’s conception of God is more radical than scholars have been willing to allow. It is not the case that, for Arnauld, God acts for reasons, with His will guided by wisdom (much as the God of Malebranche and Leibniz acts), albeit by a wisdom impenetrable to us. Arnauld’s objections to Malebranche are directed not only at the claim that God’s wisdom is transparent to human reason, but at the whole distinction between will and wisdom in God, even if that wisdom were “hidden.” Arnauld’s God, in fact, approaches the extreme voluntarist God of Descartes, and thus transcends practical rational agency altogether.

Oxford University Press is proud to present the third volume in a new annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of philosophy. Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries---the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, very roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes papers on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The articles in OSEMP will be of importance to specialists within the discipline, but the editors also intend that they should appeal to a larger audience of philosophers, intellectual historians, and others who are interested in the development of modern thought.

Recent research by scholars such as Dennis Des Chene and Roger Ariew, among others, has deepened our knowledge of the Scholastic context of Descartes's philosophy, especially his metaphysics and natural philosophy. Helen Hattab's book is a valuable addition to this literature. Her main concern is the development from explanations by Aristotelian substantial forms in late Scholastic thought to the allegedly more perspicuous explanations that characterized the new mechanistic science. More specifically, she investigates the various contexts of Descartes's rejection of substantial forms, looking behind the rhetoric of his attack to what she claims was in fact the theory he had in sight and the arguments he used ..