Steven Nadler

This is a study of Arnauld's theory of perceptual acquaintance in the light of his commitment to Cartesian philosophy. I begin with an examination of the nature and extent of Arnauld's commitment to Descartes' method and metaphysics. In chapter III I look at Malebranche's theory of ideas and perception, arguing that it is open to both a representationalist interpretation and, in some contexts, a direct realist interpretation. Arnauld's critique of Malebranche is examined in chapter IV. In chapter V I present an analysis of Arnauld's act theory of ideas wherein I argue that Arnauld holds a direct realist account of our perceptual acquaintance with the external world. Arnauld's understanding of 'idea' often follows Descartes' own use of the term. I support this claim by examining several important contexts from Descartes' where 'idea' is used to refer not to mental objects perceived, but rather to mental acts or operations. Finally, in chapter VI, I turn to Arnauld's account of the intentionality of perception. I first examine briefly the notion of 'objective being' as it appears in late scholastic thought and in Descartes. I then look at the way in which the representational content/objective reality of ideas is central to Arnauld's theory of intentionality

This article is a reply to an earlier piece by kenneth seeskin (philosophy and literature, 1982). I argue that socrates' defense is more of a parody of gorgian rhetoric than seeskin is willing to allow. They key lies in socrates' use of rhetoric to persuade the beliefs of the athenian jurors by means of probabilities. When replying to the expressed pretexts of the trial, He uses "base" rhetoric; when finally attending to the real reasons behind his accusations, He resorts to "the truth about his life."

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity by Steven B. SmithSteven NadlerSteven B. Smith. Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. Pp. xvii + 270. Cloth, $30.00.Steven B. Smith’s aim in this elegant, well-written book is to restore Spinoza to his important and rightful place in the history of political and religious thought. At the heart of the book is a discussion of the central themes of the Theological-Political Treatise, with a good deal of attention given both to Spinoza’s other writings and to other political thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, as well as to the immediate historical situation in the mid-seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. But this is more than just a commentary on a work that for a long time has largely (and unjustly) been ignored by philosophers. Smith has a full appreciation of the radical nature of the Treatise, and uses it to bring out what is peculiarly fascinating about Spinoza’s religious and political ideas.According to Smith, it was Spinoza who first made the “Jewish Question”—the problem of how the Jews, after centuries of separation and ghettoization, can be granted admission to, and even assimilation into, the modern polity—central to reflection on the “theological-political problem,” that is, the problem of the place and role of religion in the state. Smith sees Spinoza’s solution to both problems in the process of secularization. Jews must, in order to become an integrated part of modern society, shed their ancient, traditional identity; Judaism has to be transformed from “an authoritative body of revealed law into what today would be called a modern secular identity” (xiii). The allegiance of Jews must be transferred from the Law to laws, from a life of halakhic (or Jewish legal) ritual to a life focussed on nonsectarian, civil and social duties. Particularism—and this would be true of all historical religious identities that will, ideally, be absorbed into the modern state—must be exchanged for universalism.Smith shows how Spinoza’s thinking on the Jewish question is intimately bound up with his particular political philosophy. He argues, in fact, that the Treatise represents the “first and most profound expression of the Jewish-liberal symbiosis that has survived to the present.” For the kind of polity that will make Jewish emancipation possible and foster the emergence of a modern, secular, nonparticularistic Jewish identity is the democratic, liberal state. But if liberalism, through its offer of toleration and participation, nourishes modern Judaism, it is no less true, Smith claims, that it has taken its own sustenance from Jewish traditions. Rabbinic Judaism, with its emphasis on law, has long served as a model for classical liberal thought.Spinoza himself is, in Smith’s eyes (although Smith is certainly not the first to suggest this) the “prototype” of the modern emancipated Jew, liberated from (and even critical of) religious tradition and authority. He is, in other words, the first “secular Jew.” Amsterdam, meanwhile, with its linked traditions of toleration and commerce, is the prototype of the modern, liberal society, one that both offers the conditions for Jewish emancipation and is ever vigilant against interference from ambitious religious authorities. Smith does not really take note of the fact that Dutch society in the Golden Age, with its rigid system of regent families controlling the all-important municipal governments, was far from democratic. And it seems to me misleading to speak of Spinoza as a “secular Jew.” Spinoza seems to have liberated himself—with a [End Page 321] little help from his congregation’s rabbis—not only from an orthodox conformity to Jewish traditions, but from any sense of Jewish identity whatsoever. Perhaps it might be more accurate to call Spinoza the “first secular citizen.”One of the more contentious claims of Smith’s book is his insistence that Spinoza’s Treatise contains an esoteric dimension, an intentionally hidden doctrine that only the most careful readers could ascertain. Part of the defense of this Straussian model is the identification of “deliberate contradictions” in the text. I, for one, do not see any esoteric doctrines in the Treatise; nor...

CONTRARY TO WHAT APPEARS TO BE POPULAR BELIEF, PORT-ROYAL WAS NOT A BASTION OF CARTESIANISM. IN FACT, OF ALL THE PORT-ROYALISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, ONLY ARNAULD CAN BE CONSIDERED A CARTESIAN IN ANY INTERESTING SENSE. MOST OF THE OTHERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ORDER WERE HOSTILE TO THE NEW PHILOSOPHY AND ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNED AGAINST IT, BELIEVING IT TO POSE A THREAT TO PIETY AND "TRUE" RELIGION. THIS CAN BE SEEN BY EXAMINING THE WRITINGS OF DE SACY, DU VAUCEL, AND NICOLE, AND THE VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS THEY RAISE AGAINST DESCARTES'S PHILOSOPHY

The seventeenth-century Dutch-Jewish philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, was expelled from the Amsterdam Portuguese- Jewish community when he was a young man, and in his philosophy he adopts a critical, even hostile attitude toward sectarian religions. Scholars have debated the extent to which Spinoza's thought, despite his own fraught relationship to Judaism, belongs to the history of Jewish philosophy. This review article looks at various trends in scholarship on Spinoza and Judaism, and particularly at recent illuminating work showing the precedents of Spinoza's ideas in medieval Jewish rationalism, especially Maimonides.