Steven Nadler

This is a study of Arnauld's theory of perceptual acquaintance in the light of his commitment to Cartesian philosophy. I begin with an examination of the nature and extent of Arnauld's commitment to Descartes' method and metaphysics. In chapter III I look at Malebranche's theory of ideas and perception, arguing that it is open to both a representationalist interpretation and, in some contexts, a direct realist interpretation. Arnauld's critique of Malebranche is examined in chapter IV. In chapter V I present an analysis of Arnauld's act theory of ideas wherein I argue that Arnauld holds a direct realist account of our perceptual acquaintance with the external world. Arnauld's understanding of 'idea' often follows Descartes' own use of the term. I support this claim by examining several important contexts from Descartes' where 'idea' is used to refer not to mental objects perceived, but rather to mental acts or operations. Finally, in chapter VI, I turn to Arnauld's account of the intentionality of perception. I first examine briefly the notion of 'objective being' as it appears in late scholastic thought and in Descartes. I then look at the way in which the representational content/objective reality of ideas is central to Arnauld's theory of intentionality

This article is a reply to an earlier piece by kenneth seeskin (philosophy and literature, 1982). I argue that socrates' defense is more of a parody of gorgian rhetoric than seeskin is willing to allow. They key lies in socrates' use of rhetoric to persuade the beliefs of the athenian jurors by means of probabilities. When replying to the expressed pretexts of the trial, He uses "base" rhetoric; when finally attending to the real reasons behind his accusations, He resorts to "the truth about his life."

Most discussions of Spinoza and consciousness—and there are not many— conclude either that he does not have an account of consciousness, or that he does have one but that it is at best confused, at worst hopeless. I argue, in fact, that people have been looking in the wrong place for Spinoza's account of consciousness, namely, at his doctrine of "ideas of ideas". Indeed, Spinoza offers the possibility of a fairly sophisticated, naturalistic account of consciousness, one that grounds it in the nature and capacities of the body. Consciousness for Spinoza, I suggest, is a certain complexity in thinking that is the correlate of the complexity of a body, and human consciousness, for Spinoza, is nothing but the correlate in Thought of the extraordinarily high complexity of the human body in Extension. In this respect, Spinoza anticipates the conception of mind that is presently emerging from studies in the so-called ‘embodied mind’ research program. Moreover, this research program, in turn, may hold out hope for a clearer understanding of some of Spinoza's more difficult claims. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?