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9The equivalence myth of quantum mechanics —Part IStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (1): 35-61. 1995.
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55Review of Paul Dicken, Constructive Empiricism. Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2). 2011.
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114Is Standard Quantum Mechanics Technologically Inadequate?British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3): 595-604. 2007.In a recent issue of this journal, P.E. Vermaas ([2005]) claims to have demonstrated that standard quantum mechanics is technologically inadequate in that it violates the 'technical functions condition'. We argue that this claim is false because based on a 'narrow' interpretation of this technical functions condition that Vermaas can only accept on pain of contradiction. We also argue that if, in order to avoid this contradiction, the technical functions condition is interpreted 'widely' rather …Read more
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185Discerning elementary particlesPhilosophy of Science 76 (2): 179-200. 2009.We maximally extend the quantum‐mechanical results of Muller and Saunders ( 2008 ) establishing the ‘weak discernibility’ of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in finite‐dimensional Hilbert spaces. This confutes the currently dominant view that ( A ) the quantum‐mechanical description of similar particles conflicts with Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII); and that ( B ) the only way to save PII is by adopting some heavy metaphysical notion such as Scotusian haecceit…Read more
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33The locality scandal of quantum mechanicsIn Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (ed.), Language, Quantum, Music, . pp. 241--248. 1999.
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48Erratum: Can a Constructive Empiricist Adopt the Concept of Observability?Philosophy of Science 71 (4): 635-. 2004.
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146The equivalence myth of quantum mechanics —Part IStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (1): 35-61. 1997.The author endeavours to show two things: first, that Schrödingers (and Eckarts) demonstration in March (September) 1926 of the equivalence of matrix mechanics, as created by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan and Dirac in 1925, and wave mechanics, as created by Schrödinger in 1926, is not foolproof; and second, that it could not have been foolproof, because at the time matrix mechanics and wave mechanics were neither mathematically nor empirically equivalent. That they were is the Equivalence Myth. In or…Read more
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28Patrick Suppes, Representation and invariance of scientific structures, CSLI publications, Stanford, California (distributed by Chicago University Press), ISBN 1-57586-333-2, 2002 (pp. ix+536, US $50.00) (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (4): 713-720. 2004.
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60Circular Discernment in Completely Extensive Structures and How to Avoid such Circles GenerallyStudia Logica 100 (5): 947-952. 2012.In this journal (Studia Logica), D. Rizza [2010: 176] expounded a solution of what he called “the indiscernibility problem for ante rem structuralism”, which is the problem to make sense of the presence, in structures, of objects that are indiscernible yet distinct, by only appealing to what that structure provides. We argue that Rizza’s solution is circular and expound a different solution that not only solves the problem for completely extensive structures, treated by Rizza, but for nearly (bu…Read more
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211The implicit definition of the set-conceptSynthese 138 (3). 2004.Once Hilbert asserted that the axioms of a theory `define` theprimitive concepts of its language `implicitly''. Thus whensomeone inquires about the meaning of the set-concept, thestandard response reads that axiomatic set-theory defines itimplicitly and that is the end of it. But can we explainthis assertion in a manner that meets minimum standards ofphilosophical scrutiny? Is Jané (2001) wrong when hesays that implicit definability is ``an obscure notion''''? Doesan explanation of it presuppose…Read more
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173Sets, classes, and categoriesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 539-573. 2001.This paper, accessible for a general philosophical audience having only some fleeting acquaintance with set-theory and category-theory, concerns the philosophy of mathematics, specifically the bearing of category-theory on the foundations of mathematics. We argue for six claims. (I) A founding theory for category-theory based on the primitive concept of a set or a class is worthwile to pursue. (II) The extant set-theoretical founding theories for category-theory are conceptually flawed. (III) Th…Read more
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69Maxwell’s Lonely WarStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (1): 109-119. 2004.Essay Review of two books of A.N. Maxwell, last of the Neo-Popperians: The Comprehensibility of the Universe (1998) and The Human World in the Physical Universe (2001).
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217Deflating skolemSynthese 143 (3): 223-253. 2005.. Remarkably, despite the tremendous success of axiomatic set-theory in mathematics, logic and meta-mathematics, e.g., model-theory, two philosophical worries about axiomatic set-theory as the adequate catch of the set-concept keep haunting it. Having dealt with one worry in a previous paper in this journal, we now fulfil a promise made there, namely to deal with the second worry. The second worry is the Skolem Paradox and its ensuing Skolemite skepticism. We present a comparatively novel and s…Read more
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138The Rise of RelationalsMind 124 (493): 201-237. 2015.I begin by criticizing an elaboration of an argument in this journal due to Hawley , who argued that, where Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles faces counterexamples, invoking relations to save PII fails. I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to a particular distinction. I proceed by demonstrating that in most putative counterexamples to PII , the so-called Discerning Defence trumps the Summing Defence of PII. The general kind of objects that do the discerning in al…Read more
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Book review (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (4): 713-720. 2004.
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128The equivalence myth of quantum mechanics—part IIStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (2): 219-247. 1997.The author endeavours to show two things: first, that Schrödingers (and Eckarts) demonstration in March (September) 1926 of the equivalence of matrix mechanics, as created by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan and Dirac in 1925, and wave mechanics, as created by Schrödinger in 1926, is not foolproof; and second, that it could not have been foolproof, because at the time matrix mechanics and wave mechanics were neither mathematically nor empirically equivalent. That they were is the Equivalence Myth. In or…Read more
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794Reflections on the revolution at StanfordSynthese 183 (1): 87-114. 2011.We inquire into the question whether the Aristotelean or classical \emph{ideal} of science has been realised by the Model Revolution, initiated at Stanford University during the 1950ies and spread all around the world of philosophy of science --- \emph{salute} P.\ Suppes. The guiding principle of the Model Revolution is: \emph{a scientific theory is a set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory}, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate. We expound some critical refl…Read more
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87A defence of constructive empiricism against an attack of N. Maxwell by means of his pet-thesis that science implicitly and permanently accepts a metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe. We argue that Maxwell's attack can be beaten off; that his arguments do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish; and that we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertatian nature of constructive empiricism.
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496Withering away, weaklySynthese 180 (2). 2011.One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they 'whither away', and when they wither away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results est…Read more
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70Essay Review of B.C. van Fraassen's *Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective* (2008).
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43The characterisation of structure: Definition versus axiomatisationIn F. Stadler, D. Dieks, W. Gonzales, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 399--416. 2010.