Soraj Hongladarom

This collection brings together different philosophical points of view discussing two important aspects of human life, namely love and friendship, within the broad context of comparative philosophy. These points of view differ in terms of their cultural orientations - East or West, ancient or modern; philosophical methodologies - analytical, historical, experimental, or phenomenological, broadly construed; and motivation - explanatory, revisionary, or argumentative. The volume is a comparative treatment of how diverse philosophical cultures view love and friendship, such as how Aristotle and Confucius’ views on friendship are similar and different, how the ancient Greeks and the Buddhists view friendship and happiness, and how posthumous love is possible. With contributions from a diverse set of scholars, this book presents the emerging views of Southeast Asian philosophers compared with those of philosophers from other regions, including Europe and North America. The volume thus provides a multi-faceted way of understanding love and friendship across cultures, and will be relevant to scholars interested in philosophy, the history of ideas, Asian Studies, and religious studies.

This book investigates the emerging phenomenon of the self as it exists in the online world. It argues for an externalist conception of self and identity, one that does not depend on the continuity of consciousness of the subject. It also offers an analysis of related phenomenon such as online friendship and games based on this analysis. An outstanding feature of social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace is that it allows for the user to put forward their “selves” or their identity onto the Internet and use the online self as an anchor to connect with any number of “friends” each of whom also has their own online selves. A number of questions then arise which are deeply conceptual and philosophical in nature: What is the metaphysical nature of this emerging online self? Is it the same or fundamentally different from the “offline” self with which we are already familiar? Since increasing numbers of people are connected to the online world, this world itself seems to be taking on a reality of its own. This much has been appreciated by a number of scholars in the field. However, there seems to be lacking a systematic study of the philosophical and metaphysical nature of the self that has become a key element in cyberspace, a key topic which this volume addresses. Apart from the problem of constitution of the online self, this volume addresses related questions concerning personal identity in the online world and scrutinizes computer games and the characteristics that they share with social networking sites. Unlike the majority of the existing literature, which discusses the topic from a more social scientific perspective, this volume fills the lacuna of a philosophical and theoretical study of the online world.​

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one.

This book brings together different intercultural philosophical points of view discussing the philosophical impact of what we call the ‘appropriated’ religions of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is home to most of the world religions. Buddhism is predominantly practiced in Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia; Islam in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei; and Christianity in the Philippines and Timor-Leste. Historical data show, however, that these world religions are imported cultural products, and have been reimagined, assimilated, and appropriated by the culture that embraced them. In this collection, we see that these ‘appropriated’ religions imply a culturally nuanced worldview, which, in turn, impacts how the traditional problems in the philosophy of religion are framed and answered—in particular, questions about the existence and nature of the divine, the problem of evil, and the nature of life after death. Themes explored include: religious belief and digital transition, Theravāda Buddhist philosophy, religious diversity, Buddhism and omniscience, indigenous belief systems, divine apology and unmerited human suffering, dialetheism and the problem of evil, Buddhist philosophy and Spinoza’s views on death and immortality, belief and everyday realities in the Philippines, comparative religious philosophy, gendering the Hindu concept of dharma, Christian devotion and salvation during the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines through the writings of Jose Rizal, indigenous Islamic practices in the Philippines, practiced traditions in contemporary Filipino celebrations of Christmas, role of place-aspects in the appropriation of religions in Southeast Asia, and fate and divine omniscience. This book is of interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, anthropology of religion, cultural studies, comparative religion, religious studies, and Asian studies.

There is no evidence that Spinoza knew anything about Buddhism, but his philosophy bears certain similarities with Buddhist philosophy, or at least as shall be argued later. This paper compares and contrasts Spinoza’s thoughts on death and immortality with Buddhist philosophy. According to Spinoza, the death of a human being is a process whereby the body, as a mode of Substance, is modified according to natural law. However, Spinoza’s view on the mind or the soul is interesting. In Book V of the Ethics, he says, “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (VP23). This proposition has generated a considerable number of commentaries. This paper notes some similarities and differences between Spinoza’s thoughts and the corresponding view in Buddhist philosophy. Spinoza’s idea bears an interesting similarity with Buddhist philosophy. The mind that survives, both in Spinoza and in Buddhist philosophy, is not personal but is mind in general, in the same way as bodies are essentially extension in general.

This book is a collection of selected papers that were presented at the First International Conference of the Asia-Pacific Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics (APSAFE 2013), which was held at Chulalongkorn University from November 28 - 30, 2013. The papers are interdisciplinary, containing insights into food security and food ethics from a variety of perspectives, including, but not limited to, philosophy, sociology, law, sociology, economics, as well as the natural sciences. The theme of the conference was to consider the interplay and balance between food security and food ethics as the world approaches the middle part of the twenty-first century.

Global Philosophy of Religion is a constructive approach to the philosophy of religion. It aims to incorporate various religious perspectives to diversify the field’s theoretical and practical resources. Proponents of this approach hope that these diverse resources may aid in the progress of the traditional problems of the field. In this introductory chapter, we discuss how the perspectives from Southeast Asia, particularly those from what we call “appropriated religions,” may help in this endeavor.

Supererogation in Buddhist philosophy is a rather neglected topic. Among the questions to be investigated are: “Is there supererogation in Buddhism?” “Can one explicate the examples of apparently supererogatory acts performed by bodhisattvas and other enlightened beings in terms of supererogation?” “Is there room in Buddhist ethics for acts which are neither obligatory but still meritorious?” The answer that I aim to defend here is that there is a place for supererogation in Buddhism, as exemplified, among others, by the acts of Buddhist saints and practitioners who perform action that exceeds normal expectation. Supererogation depends on the existence of minimal norms, and I argue that in the Sigalovāda Sutta the Buddha did lay out such minimal norms which are expected of lay people who are not practitioners. This discussion will shed light not only on Buddhist ethical theory itself but also serve as a contribution to the ongoing discussion of the nature and possible justification of supererogation itself.

This volume is a collection of selected papers presented at the Second Asia-Pacific Computing and Philsosophy Conference, which was held in Bangkok, Thailand in January 2005. The conference was organized by the Center for Ethics of Science and Technology, Chulalongkorn University on behalf of the International Association of Computing and Philosophy (www.ia-cap.org). Computing have had a long relationship with philosophy, starting from the problem of how symbols being manipulated in computing bear a relation to the outside world, to those of artificial intelligence, robotics, computer simulation, and so on. Moreover, as computer technologies have become thoroughly pervasive in today's environment, there are also issues concerning social and ethical impacts brought about by them. The papers in the volume represent a wide variety of concerns and various dimensions within which computing and philosophy are related. Furthermore, it also represents some of the first attempts to highlight cultural dimensions of computing and philosophy, which became prominent when the conference was held for the first time within the milieu of an Asian culture. (The First Asia-Pacific Computing and Philosophy was held in Canberra, Australia.) Hence, many of the papers in the volume address this added dimension. Apart form the usual problems of how computers and human lives are interconnected, the papers here also discuss how computers are related to human lives as lived in a specific culture. Thus the book breaks a new ground and should be of interest to a wide range of scholars and students who are interested, not only on computing and philosophy generally construed, but also on this exciting new dimension of how the cultures of Asia, the West, and others bear upon the traditional issues in computing and philosophy, and on how this dimension raises some new concerns and agenda. Among the topics discussed in this volume are: political online forums in Saudi Arabia, e-democracy and structural transformation of public sphere, the Buddhist informational person, a glance into the lives of computerized generation in Thailand, technology and journalism in the market, local approaches and global potential (?) of information ethics, computer-enhanced good life, computer teaching ethics, and many others.

This book offers a new way to justify privacy based on a theory derived from Buddhist insights. It uses insights obtained from the Buddhist teachings on Non-Self to create an alternative theory of privacy. In doing so, the author first spells out the inherent differences between the Buddhist insights and the beliefs underlying conventional theories of privacy. While Buddhism views the self as existing conventionally through interactions with others, as well as through interrelations with other basic components, non-Buddhist ideas of self are understood as being grounded upon autonomous subjects, commonly understood to be entitled to rights and dignity. In light of this, the book offers ways in which these seemingly disparate concepts can be reconciled, while keeping in mind the need for protecting citizens' privacy in a modern information society. It also argues that the new way of conceptualizing privacy, as presented in this book, would go a long way in helping unravel the difficult concept of group privacy.

As vehicles become more autonomous, the task of designing guiding systems that make morally acceptable decisions is getting more urgent. It is sometimes assumed that one solution will be acceptable across various cultures. In this paper we argue for the importance of intercultural perspectives; in particular, we explore possible insights derived from Buddhist philosophy, taking avail of the virtue of compassion (karuṇā). We suggest that autonomous vehicles should first learn in supervised situations so that they reach a level of decision-making ability that human experts within a given culture deem morally good. How will they be evaluated? In some debates it is assumed that there is a one-fit-all answer to be found based on an agreed-upon moral theory. Apart from problems of ethical pluralism within a given culture, there are also problems due to different moral preferences and driving styles across cultures. One way the problem might be addressed is to introduce a machine-learning training curriculum that would provide autonomous vehicles with a process comparable to a novice human driver learning to drive and passing her own driving license test.

There is a significant information divide between the countries in the North and those in the South. This is detrimental to economic growth as information feeds into knowledge production. The divide is exacerbated by a series of uneven and unjust flows of information between the North and the South. Two related patterns of the unjust flow are explored, namely the flow of biological resources and information and the flow of rare manuscripts and published materials. I argue that the concept of global justice is an appropriate tool to comprehend the situation; this is an addition to those offered in Britz and Lor . Furthermore I discuss the need for increasing intra-South information flow. This will strengthen the Southern countries as a whole, since the flow will link the countries together so they have a stronger voice and chances to learn from one another directly