Anna Smajdor

Appiah distinguishes between people who are racist because they are motivated by strong ideological convictions, and those who are racist because they believe certain facts to be true. I explore to what extent this distinction might apply to those who believe in racial equality. I show that it may be risky to ignore race-related factors in the health context, while acknowledging that what constitutes race may be open to question. I discuss the idea that there are no morally relevant differences between races, however construed. I show that to base one's belief in moral equality on empirical claims, is not only inherently problematic, but in most cases, is a false account of what really motivates such beliefs. Instead, I argue that we should embrace the ideological element of a belief in moral equality. Thus, instead of arguing about whether race exists, or whether there are morally relevant differences between races, (however construed), we may open a pathway to a more honest and challenging debate. That is, how can one moral ideology demonstrate its superiority over another?.

My paper on assent and reification in research involving adults with impairments of capacity and/or communication (AWIC)1 drew many thoughtful and insightful responses. I am grateful to all who submitted commentaries. Most agreed in principle that AWIC could be better represented in medical research. However, several commentators felt that further clarification was needed in terms of what assent is and how it should be obtained and operationalised.2 I fully agree that if increased representation of AWIC is to come about through an assent-based approach, further clarificatory work is needed, and am glad to think my paper may function as a stimulus for this. Some commentators worry that an assent-based approach will impose heavy demands on researchers and entail higher costs.2 I acknowledge this, but would argue that if better inclusion of AWIC is a worthwhile goal, we should be willing to accept some costs. The move from an exclusionary to an inclusive approach will become less demanding once it is accepted as the default. And as I argue in my paper, we have resources on which to draw, including materials designed to facilitate comprehension and communication with AWIC that have been developed in other spheres,3 as well as existing protocols and structures that facilitate …

Can discussion with members of the public show philosophers where they have gone wrong? Leslie Cannold argues that it can in her 1995 paper ‘Women, Ectogenesis and Ethical Theory’, which investigates the ways in which women reason about abortion and ectogenesis. In her study, Cannold interviewed female non-philosophers. She divided her participants into separate ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’ groups and asked them to consider whether the availability of ectogenesis would change their views about the morality of dealing with an unwanted pregnancy. The women in Cannold’s study gave responses that did not map onto the dominant tropes in the philosophical literature. Yet Cannold did not attempt to reason with her participants, and her engagement with the philosophical literature is oddly limited, focussing only on the pro-choice perspective. In this paper, I explore the question of whether Cannold is correct that philosophers’ reasoning about abortion is lacking in some way. I suggest that there are alternative conclusions to be drawn from the data she gathered and that a critical approach is necessary when attempting to undertake philosophy informed by empirical data.