Hanno Sauer

Rationalism about the psychology of moral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifying moral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the ‘effectiveness’-thesis regarding moral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empirical moral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient to account for moral judgment, and that typically, moral reasoning is a matter of mere confabulation. In this survey, the empirical challenge to this thesis made by the ‘social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment and reasoning is discussed. The model claims that moral reasoning is essentially ineffective and, psychologically speaking, a matter of mere post hoc-rationalizations of cognitively impenetratable gut reactions. Several interpretations of this evidence are discussed and it is shown that there is room for a psychology of moral reasoning that can account for the available empirical evidence and yet does not have to give up the most central elements of a normative picture of moral reasoning.

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance ? in short: education ? of our moral intuitions

Many believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral ignorance excuse. I argue that the exculpatory force of moral ignorance—or lack thereof—poses a thus far overlooked challenge to moral realism. I show, firstly, that if there were any mind-independent moral truths, we would not expect there to be an asymmetry in exculpatory force between moral and ordinary ignorance at all. I then consider several attempts the realist might make to deny or accommodate this datum, and show why none of them work.

Philosophers and psychologists love psychopaths. They seem like a test case which was tailor-made for them to probe their most contested claims and theories. What is the psychological basis of moral judgment? Are moral beliefs intrinsically motivational? How should psychological disorders be defined, if they should be defined at all? Under what conditions can agents be reasonably held responsible for their conduct?Being Amoral. Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, edited by Thomas Schramme brings together some of the world’s leading experts on psychopathy and its philosophical implications. The book contains 12 original articles which are grouped into three sections: Moral Capacities and Incapacities , Issues in Moral Psychology , and Social Aspects: Blame, Transgression, and Dangerousness .The articles in this section are concerned with identifying the capacities or, rather, lack of capacities ..