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782Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of MotivationBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1): 67-87. 2016.Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect, desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem c…Read more
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543An Epistemic Case for EmpathyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1): 47-71. 2014.Much recent work on empathy assumes that one cannot give non-question-begging reasons for empathizing with others. In this article I argue that there are epistemic reasons for cultivating empathy. After sketching a brief general account of empathy, I proceed to argue that empathic information is user-friendly, fostering the achievement of widely held cognitive goals. It can also contribute to social knowledge and the satisfaction of democratic ideals. The upshot of my analysis is that there are …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Moral Psychology |