• What's Paradoxical?
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no compelling argument for holding that all truths are knowable, there are various positions in which this feature of semantic anti-realism fits naturally; rejecting this puts serious tension into a broad range of philosophical outlooks, including theism and physicalism. In the end, the paradox should be fel…Read more
  •  10
    Review of Jonathan L. Kvanvig: The Problem of Hell (review)
    Ethics 105 (4): 961-963. 1995.
  • The Paradox
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter examines the logical structure of the knowability paradox, presenting the details of the proofs that underlie the paradox, and clarifying which elements of these proofs give rise to paradox. It argues that there is no simple and obvious logical mistake in the derivation of the knowability result. A paradox has deep significance only if it arises from plausible premises. Those in question in Fitch’s proof are the claim of epistemic modesty, that some truths will never be known, and t…Read more
  • Semantical Moves
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter pursues a strategy for solving the knowability paradox in terms of the general category of the fallacies involved in substituting into intensional contexts. It clarifies and defends the indexical theory of quantification. It argues that the neo-Russellian view of quantification blocks the proofs from knowable truth to known truth, and that the objections raised in the literature to this approach are not damaging.
  • Syntactic Restriction Strategies
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend that the claim that all truths are knowable must be restricted in some way to express an anti-realist commitment. All examples of such an approach are rejected, and it is argued that even if there was a successful restriction strategy, the paradox would remain untouched.
  •  26
    Sosa's virtue epistemology
    Critica 42 (125): 47-62. 2010.
    Ernest Sosa's latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that Sosa's latest virtue epi…Read more
  • Rules for the Knowledge Operator
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies truth, and the second is that knowledge distributes over conjunction, so that knowledge of a conjunction constitutes knowledge of the conjuncts. It is argued that the paradox cannot be avoided by questioning these principles.
  • Reservations about the Underlying Logic
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox mu…Read more
  •  7
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 8 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  4
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 6 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  5
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  • Introduction
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of the knowability paradox — a paradox deriving from a proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known — which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It cites the relative obscurity of the proof and paradox since its publication, and identifies the two problems created by Fitch’s proof. The chapters included in this volume are then described.
  • Conclusion
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter discusses the process of developing a solution to knowability paradox. It presents a detailed analysis of the paradox. It argues that the neo-Russellian theory of quantification is the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.
  •  19
    Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (edited book)
    Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
    Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a critical perspective on Plantinga's landmark work, but also provides in one volume a clear statement of the variety of approaches to the nature of warrant within contemporary epistemology and to the connections between epistemology and meta…Read more
  •  92
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is a new annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy ...
  •  42
    Truth and superassertibility
    Philosophical Studies 93 (1): 1-19. 1999.
  •  4
    Perspectivalism and Reflective Assent
    In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 223-242. 2013.
  • ``Coherentism"
    In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. 1992.
  •  35
    The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to…Read more
  •  140
    Epistemic Luck
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 272-281. 2008.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provid…Read more
  •  91
    Norms of assertion
    In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250. 2011.
  •  138
    Pointless truth
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 199-212. 2008.
    No Abstract
  • Divine Omniscience
    In Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh S. Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 498-499. 2000.
  •  68
    The haecceity theory and perspectival limitation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 295-305. 1989.
    This Article does not have an abstract