•  7
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 8 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  5
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  4
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 6 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  18
    Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (edited book)
    Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
    Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a critical perspective on Plantinga's landmark work, but also provides in one volume a clear statement of the variety of approaches to the nature of warrant within contemporary epistemology and to the connections between epistemology and meta…Read more
  •  92
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is a new annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy ...
  •  42
    Truth and superassertibility
    Philosophical Studies 93 (1): 1-19. 1999.
  •  4
    Perspectivalism and Reflective Assent
    In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 223-242. 2013.
  •  140
    Epistemic Luck
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 272-281. 2008.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provid…Read more
  •  91
    Norms of assertion
    In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250. 2011.
  • ``Coherentism"
    In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology, Continuum Press. 2010.
  •  35
    The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to…Read more
  •  68
    The haecceity theory and perspectival limitation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 295-305. 1989.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  • ``Jonathan Edwards on Hell"
    In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. pp. 1-12. 2003.
  •  85
    What is wrong with minimal foundationalism?
    Erkenntnis 21 (2): 175-184. 1984.
    attacks new defenders of foundationalism. Some simply took on the critics, 2 but others attempted to argue that even if the critics were right, only one form of foundationalism was suspect, not foundationalism itself. For, according to these defenders, foundationalism is not to be identified with the view of Classical Foundationalism (CE) that all of our knowledge rests on incorrigible beliefs. Rather foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests on beliefs that are self-warranting…Read more
  •  139
    Pointless truth
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 199-212. 2008.
    No Abstract
  • Divine Omniscience
    In Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 498-499. 2000.
  •  9
    Truth is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal
    In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 285-295. 2013.
  •  58
    Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox
    Res Philosophica 93 (3): 1-532. 2016.
    One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectual humility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectual humility are appropriate, whether voiced verbally or…Read more
  •  2
    Phil 418: Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 99
  •  181
    Closure principles
    Philosophy Compass 1 (3). 2006.
    A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you know that q. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you are in a position to know that p, or if you …Read more
  •  54
    Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 466-480. 2003.
    Though I find the project significant and unprecedented in this way, I am not convinced that it is entirely successful, and I will try to explain here the grounds of my concern. We can begin with Greco’s list of requirements for an adequate theory of knowledge, and the relationship he sees between simple reliabilism and his own theory, agent reliabilism.
  • ``Hasker on Fatalism"
    Philosophical Studies 67 91-101. 1992.
  •  5
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2016.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
  •  158
    Coherentists' Distractions
    Philosophical Topics 23 (1): 257-274. 1995.
    The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
  • Five Questions about Epistemology
    In Duncan Pritchard & Vincent Hendricks (eds.), Epistemology: 5 Questions, Automatic Press/vip. 2008.
  • ``The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent"
    In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Critics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011.