•  1516
    Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 21-41. 2012.
    The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
  •  78
    Swain on the basing relation
    Analysis 45 (3): 153. 1985.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even …Read more
  • ``Heaven and Hell"
    In Charles Taliaferro & Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 562-568. 1997.
  •  118
    The Value of Understanding
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-112. 2009.