Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Philosophical reflection concerning heaven and hell has focused on the place of such doctrines in the great monotheistic religions emanating from the religion of the ancient people of Israel--Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The philosophical issues that arise concerning these doctrines is not limited to such traditions, however. Consider, for example, the doctrine of hell. Any religion promises certain benefits to its adherents, and these benefits require some contrast that befalls, or might befall, those who fail to adhere to the religion in question.

The standard view concerning types of theories of justification is that there are two types of theories: foundational and coherence theories. Foundationalism is generally taken to be what I call Minimal Foundationalism, which is a weaker form of foundationalism than Classical Foundationalism. I argue that this taxonomical scheme is inadequate since it fails to separate theories that are intuitively different, and it places some theories that are avowedly of one sort in the other type of theory. ;A different classification scheme depending on a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is then offered. That distinction concerns whether what a person thinks, or is able to think on simple reflection, concerning his having met certain conditions for justification affects his justification. The two possible effects are that the satisfaction of a condition for justification entails that a person is able to think that this condition is satisfied, and that a person's ability to think that a condition is satisfied entails that that condition is satisfied. Thus, the most subjective theory possible is when a mutual entailment relation holds between these conditions and a person's possible thoughts about these conditions. I then show how this classification scheme is able to properly characterize many actual theories of justification, and how it can enlighten one as to the nature of different sorts of theories. ;The major task undertaken is to show that a completely subjective theory of justification is adequate to that sort of justification relevant to knowledge. A completely subjective theory of justification claims that it is logically necessary and sufficient for a belief to be justified that, roughly, the person is able to think on simple reflection that the belief is justified. It is defended that when this sort of justification is undefeated and occurs with true belief, knowledge is the result. Thus, contrary to the major views concerning knowledge in the history of philosophy, quite an extensive degree of subjectivity in justification is compatible with out intuitions concerning knowledge

This is the sixth volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with earlier volumes, these chapters follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion.

I came to epistemology through an interest in the concept of rationality, and especially through the attacks on the rationality of religious believers. My thoughts at the time focused on the disappointing quality of the arguments for and against religious belief, and I recall being astonished at the time that philosophers capable of such penetrating insight in other areas had nothing that seemed either penetrating or original. The defenders sounded too much like mere apologists for the faith, and the attackers arid and dull, with both sides often exuding a scent of intellectual dishonesty.