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48“He who lapse last lapse best”: Plantinga on leibniz’s lapseSouthwest Philosophy Review 10 (1): 137-146. 1994.
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3Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 2 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2009.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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``Hell"In Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 413-427. 2008.
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The questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth range from complete skepticism about such value to more discriminating concerns about the precise nature of the value in question and the comparative judgment that one of the two is more valuable than the other
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29Virtue EpistemologyIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 199--207. 2010.
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136Epistemic LuckPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 272-281. 2008.Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provid…Read more
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91Norms of assertionIn Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250. 2011.
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35Restriction strategies for knowability : Some lessons in false hopeIn Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. 2009.The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to…Read more
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Divine OmniscienceIn Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 498-499. 2000.
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68The haecceity theory and perspectival limitationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 295-305. 1989.This Article does not have an abstract
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``Jonathan Edwards on Hell"In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. pp. 1-12. 2003.
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, An Epistemic Theory of CreationIn Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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9Truth is Not the Primary Epistemic GoalIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 285-295. 2013.
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56Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface ParadoxRes Philosophica 93 (3): 1-532. 2016.One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectual humility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectual humility are appropriate, whether voiced verbally or…Read more
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177Closure principlesPhilosophy Compass 1 (3). 2006.A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you know that q. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you are in a position to know that p, or if you …Read more
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54Further Thoughts on Agent ReliabilismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 466-480. 2003.Though I find the project significant and unprecedented in this way, I am not convinced that it is entirely successful, and I will try to explain here the grounds of my concern. We can begin with Greco’s list of requirements for an adequate theory of knowledge, and the relationship he sees between simple reliabilism and his own theory, agent reliabilism.
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393Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?The Monist 81 (3): 426-451. 1998.National Enquirer commercials tell us that some people want to know. I have no idea what such a desire has to do with reading tabloid journalism, but the avowal of wanting to know interests me. Maybe this desire is shared by all; at the very least, curiosity is universal. Curiosity may amount to a desire for knowledge, or perhaps it might be explained in other terms, such as a desire for understanding or for finding the truth. Perhaps none of these, even. Maybe the desire is only one of being ab…Read more
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5Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7 (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2016.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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157Coherentists' DistractionsPhilosophical Topics 23 (1): 257-274. 1995.The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |