•  2
    Review of Jonathan L. Kvanvig: The Problem of Hell (review)
    Ethics 105 (4): 961-963. 1995.
  • The Paradox
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter examines the logical structure of the knowability paradox, presenting the details of the proofs that underlie the paradox, and clarifying which elements of these proofs give rise to paradox. It argues that there is no simple and obvious logical mistake in the derivation of the knowability result. A paradox has deep significance only if it arises from plausible premises. Those in question in Fitch’s proof are the claim of epistemic modesty, that some truths will never be known, and t…Read more
  • Semantical Moves
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter pursues a strategy for solving the knowability paradox in terms of the general category of the fallacies involved in substituting into intensional contexts. It clarifies and defends the indexical theory of quantification. It argues that the neo-Russellian view of quantification blocks the proofs from knowable truth to known truth, and that the objections raised in the literature to this approach are not damaging.
  • Syntactic Restriction Strategies
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend that the claim that all truths are knowable must be restricted in some way to express an anti-realist commitment. All examples of such an approach are rejected, and it is argued that even if there was a successful restriction strategy, the paradox would remain untouched.
  •  4
    Sosa's virtue epistemology
    Critica 42 (125): 47-62. 2010.
    Ernest Sosa's latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that Sosa's latest virtue epi…Read more
  • Rules for the Knowledge Operator
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies truth, and the second is that knowledge distributes over conjunction, so that knowledge of a conjunction constitutes knowledge of the conjuncts. It is argued that the paradox cannot be avoided by questioning these principles.
  • Reservations about the Underlying Logic
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox mu…Read more
  •  7
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 8 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  3
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 6 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  4
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  • Introduction
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of the knowability paradox — a paradox deriving from a proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known — which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It cites the relative obscurity of the proof and paradox since its publication, and identifies the two problems created by Fitch’s proof. The chapters included in this volume are then described.
  • Conclusion
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), The Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
    This chapter discusses the process of developing a solution to knowability paradox. It presents a detailed analysis of the paradox. It argues that the neo-Russellian theory of quantification is the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.
  •  19
    Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology (edited book)
    Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
    Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a critical perspective on Plantinga's landmark work, but also provides in one volume a clear statement of the variety of approaches to the nature of warrant within contemporary epistemology and to the connections between epistemology and meta…Read more
  •  8
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is a new annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy ...
  •  9
    Truth and superassertibility
    Philosophical Studies 93 (1): 1-19. 1999.
  •  4
    Perspectivalism and Reflective Assent
    In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 223-242. 2013.
  •  9
    The Analogy Argument for a Limited Acccount of Omniscience
    International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2): 129-138. 1989.
    IN COMPARISON with other doctrines Cthe doctrine of omnipotence, for example Cthe proper formulation of the doctrine of omniscience has not seemed especially problematic. Once we accept the contemporary wisdom that knowledge is knowledge of truths, the formulation of the traditional doctrine seems straightforward: to be omniscient is just to know all truths. What has seemed problematic, rather, is whether the doctrine is itself true. In particular, many have wondered whether anyone can know the …Read more
  •  35
    How to Be a Reliabilist
    American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2). 1986.
    In recent years, epistemologists have become increasingly impressed with reliabilist theories of justification. 1 Reliabilism is often formulated as the claim that a belief is justified 2 just in case it is a reliable belief; however, this formulation can be somewhat misleading. There is a sense in which a set of beliefs can be reliable, just as a certain history or testimony can be reliable: what one means is that a certain set of propositions is highly accurate, has mostly true members, or is …Read more
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3: Volume 3 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century.
  •  5
    ``Coherentists' Distractions"
    Philosophical Topics 23 (1): 257-275. 1995.
  • I came to epistemology through an interest in the concept of rationality, and especially through the attacks on the rationality of religious believers. My thoughts at the time focused on the disappointing quality of the arguments for and against religious belief, and I recall being astonished at the time that philosophers capable of such penetrating insight in other areas had nothing that seemed either penetrating or original. The defenders sounded too much like mere apologists for the faith, an…Read more
  •  87
    ``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist"
    In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 89-112. 2008.
  •  2
    On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 173-190. 2005.
    There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here
  •  11
    Creation and conservation
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  14
    Review: Zagzebski on Justification (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1). 2000.
  • ``Epistemic Justification"
    In Sven Bernecker Duncan Pritchard (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2010.