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38In defending his rejection of Maverick Molinism (Faith and Philosophy 20.1, (January 2003), pp. 91-100) from my criticisms (Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 348-357), Tom Flint attributes three central claims to my argument, and disagrees with two of them. He also notes my request for a defense of the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle, which his argument employs. He portrays that discussion as taking “potshots” at his argument, in part because I denied that concerns about the Law are compell…Read more
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60The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary EpistemologySavage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 1992.
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110Against Pragmatic EncroachmentLogos and Episteme 2 (1): 77-85. 2011.Anti-intellectualist theories of knowledge claim that in some way or other, practical stakes are involved in whether knowledge is present (or, where the view iscontextualist, whether sentences about knowledge are true in a given context). Interest in pragmatic encroachment arose with the development of contextualist theories concerning knowledge ascriptions. In these cases, there is an initial situation in which hardly anything is at stake, and knowledge is easily ascribed. The subsequent situat…Read more
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13Resurrection, Heaven, and HellIn Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper & Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Works cited.
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24Ii—millar On The Value Of KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 83-99. 2011.Alan Millar's paper involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
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28``Precìs of T he Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding "In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 309--313. 2009.Reflection on the issues surrounding the value of knowledge and other cognitive states of interest to epistemologists can be traced to the conversation between Socrates and Meno in Plato’s dialogue named after the latter. The context of discussion concerns the hiring of a guide to get one to Larissa, and the proposal on the table is that one would want a guide who knows the way. Socrates sees a problem, however, for it is not clear why a guide with merely true opinion will not be just as good.
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2``Disagreement and Reflective Ascent"In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), New Essays on Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012.
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48“He who lapse last lapse best”: Plantinga on leibniz’s lapseSouthwest Philosophy Review 10 (1): 137-146. 1994.
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3Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 2 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2009.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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91Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (edited book)Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 1996.Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
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``Hell"In Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 413-427. 2008.
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The questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth range from complete skepticism about such value to more discriminating concerns about the precise nature of the value in question and the comparative judgment that one of the two is more valuable than the other
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135Epistemic LuckPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 272-281. 2008.Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provid…Read more
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91Norms of assertionIn Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250. 2011.
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35Restriction strategies for knowability : Some lessons in false hopeIn Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. 2009.The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to…Read more
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68The haecceity theory and perspectival limitationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 295-305. 1989.This Article does not have an abstract
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``Jonathan Edwards on Hell"In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. pp. 1-12. 2003.
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, An Epistemic Theory of CreationIn Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |