-
344Lewis on Finkish DispositionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 703-710. 1999.Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis’s account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
-
147Tennant on knowabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4). 1999.The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.
-
75Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical TheologyOxford University Press UK. 2011.Jonathan Kvanvig presents a compelling new work in philosophical theology on the universe, creation, and the afterlife. Organised thematically by the endpoints of time, the volume begins by addressing eschatological matters and the doctrines of heaven and hell and ends with an account of divine deliberation and creation. Kvanvig develops a coherent theistic outlook which reconciles a traditional, high conception of deity, with full providential control over all aspects of creation, with a concep…Read more
-
125The confusion over foundationalismPhilosophia 16 (3-4): 345-354. 1986.Foundationalism came under attack in two areas in the first half of this century. First, some doubted whether the foundations were adequate to support the entire structure of knowledge, and second, the doctrine of the Agiven@ came under serious attack. = However, many epistemologists were not convinced that foundationalism was to be abandoned even if the criticisms were granted. According to these epistemologist, far from having shown that foundationalism itself was at fault, the critics of foun…Read more
-
146II—Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Millar on the Value of KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 83-99. 2011.Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge
-
14Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume (edited book)Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
-
7The Analogy Argument for a Limited Account of OmniscienceInternational Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2): 129-137. 1989.
-
133Contrastivism and closureSocial Epistemology 22 (3). 2008.This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed
-
The Swamping Problem is one of the central problems in the new valuedriven approach to epistemology that has arisen recently. Issues concerning epistemic value, however, are not new. We can find them first in Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno have a discussion about what type of guide one should prefer if one wants to get to Larissa. The first suggestion is that one should want a guide who knows the way, but Socrates notes that a guide with true opinions will work just as well. Meno…Read more
-
The valueof know ledgeis external to itIn Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge, Routledge. pp. 37. 2008.
-
24CredulismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2). 1984.Some recent philosophers of religion have addressed the question of how, and whether it is possible, that the religious experiences some persons have had can give reasons for believing that God exists. Swinburne, for example, claims that what he calls the principle of credulity implies that the religious experiences of those that have them do provide evidence for others that God exists. He formulates the principle as follows: 1 (1) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, then…Read more
-
692Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass ParadoxEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1): 1-26. 2009.The paradox of ’Buridan’s ass’ involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, say, the left bale rather than the right bal…Read more
-
58Epistemic JustificationIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 25--36. 2010.
-
51Theories of Providence and CreationRes Philosophica 90 (1): 49-67. 2013.Einstein was notoriously confident that God doesn’t play dice with the universe. Perhaps it is a confidence born of a deeper modal presumption: that Godcouldn’t play dice with the universe. If so, such confidence almost certainly disappoints. Even if God doesn’t play dice with the universe, he might. Thus arises the issue here addressed: what implications does this datum have for a proper understanding of divine providence? My interest is in theories that aim to present complete theories of prov…Read more
-
392Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?The Monist 81 (3): 426-451. 1998.National Enquirer commercials tell us that some people want to know. I have no idea what such a desire has to do with reading tabloid journalism, but the avowal of wanting to know interests me. Maybe this desire is shared by all; at the very least, curiosity is universal. Curiosity may amount to a desire for knowledge, or perhaps it might be explained in other terms, such as a desire for understanding or for finding the truth. Perhaps none of these, even. Maybe the desire is only one of being ab…Read more
-
3``Norms of Assertion"In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.
St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |