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29``Precìs of T he Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding "In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 309-313. 2009.Reflection on the issues surrounding the value of knowledge and other cognitive states of interest to epistemologists can be traced to the conversation between Socrates and Meno in Plato’s dialogue named after the latter. The context of discussion concerns the hiring of a guide to get one to Larissa, and the proposal on the table is that one would want a guide who knows the way. Socrates sees a problem, however, for it is not clear why a guide with merely true opinion will not be just as good.
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49“He who lapse last lapse best”: Plantinga on leibniz’s lapseSouthwest Philosophy Review 10 (1): 137-146. 1994.
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3Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 2 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2009.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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``Hell"In Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 413-427. 2008.
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The questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth range from complete skepticism about such value to more discriminating concerns about the precise nature of the value in question and the comparative judgment that one of the two is more valuable than the other
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7
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92Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (edited book)Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 1996.Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
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35Restriction strategies for knowability : Some lessons in false hopeIn Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. 2009.The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to…Read more
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140Epistemic LuckPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 272-281. 2008.Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provid…Read more
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91Norms of assertionIn Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250. 2011.
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Divine OmniscienceIn Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason & Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 498-499. 2000.
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68The haecceity theory and perspectival limitationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 295-305. 1989.This Article does not have an abstract
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``Jonathan Edwards on Hell"In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. pp. 1-12. 2003.
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, An Epistemic Theory of CreationIn Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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180Closure principlesPhilosophy Compass 1 (3). 2006.A dispute in epistemology has arisen over whether some class of things epistemic (things known or justified, for example) is closed under some operation involving the notion of what follows deductively from members of this class. Very few philosophers these days believe that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you know that q. But many philosophers think that something weaker holds, for instance that if you know that p, and p entails q, then you are in a position to know that p, or if you …Read more
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9Truth is Not the Primary Epistemic GoalIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 285-295. 2013.
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58Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface ParadoxRes Philosophica 93 (3): 1-532. 2016.One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectual humility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectual humility are appropriate, whether voiced verbally or…Read more
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54Further Thoughts on Agent ReliabilismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 466-480. 2003.Though I find the project significant and unprecedented in this way, I am not convinced that it is entirely successful, and I will try to explain here the grounds of my concern. We can begin with Greco’s list of requirements for an adequate theory of knowledge, and the relationship he sees between simple reliabilism and his own theory, agent reliabilism.
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5Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7 (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2016.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
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158Coherentists' DistractionsPhilosophical Topics 23 (1): 257-274. 1995.The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
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72Zagzebski on Justification (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 191--196. 2000.The heart of the epistemological interest of Zagzebski’s book is found in the tasks of clarifying the natures of justification and knowledge in terms of the intellectual virtues. It is in virtue of undertaking this task that Zagzebski presents a version of virtue epistemology. Though the book has several interesting features apart from this task, I want to argue that in its fundamental tasks, the book is a failure. In particular, I will argue that Zagzebski’s virtue account of justification is i…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |