-
14Of Reflective AscentIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 34. 2011.
-
1514Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solutionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 21-41. 2012.The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
-
Responses to CriticsIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 339-353. 2009.I begin by expressing my sincere thanks to my critics for taking time from their own impressive projects in epistemology to consider mine. Often, in reading their criticisms, I had the feeling of having received more help than I really wanted! But the truth of the matter is that we learn best by making mistakes, and I appreciate the conscientious attention to my work that my critics have shown
-
75``Closure and Alternative Possibilities"In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 456-484. 2008.
-
90Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (edited book)Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 1996.Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
-
22Divine transcendenceReligious Studies 20 (3): 377-387. 1984.Christians hold that God is transcendent, that He is other than all else that exists. For example, Paul Tillich claims, The divine beings and the Supreme Being, God, are representations of that which is ultimately referred to in the religious act. They are representations, for the unconditioned transcendent surpasses every possible conception of a being, including even the conception of a Supreme Being … It is the religious function of atheism ever to remind us that the religious act has to do w…Read more
-
11The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and TruthPhilosophical Books 35 (2): 117-119. 1994.
-
66Lewis on Finkish DispositionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 703-710. 1999.Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis’s account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
-
86Adams on actualism and presentismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2): 289-298. 1989.According to the TDT, no singular propositions about an individual and no "thisnesses" of individuals exist prior to the existence of the individual in question, where a thisness "is the property of being x, or of being identical with x" and a "singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x's qualitative properties or relations to other individuals" (p. 315) …Read more
-
59Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical TheologyOxford University Press UK. 2011.Jonathan Kvanvig presents a compelling new work in philosophical theology on the universe, creation, and the afterlife. Organised thematically by the endpoints of time, the volume begins by addressing eschatological matters and the doctrines of heaven and hell and ends with an account of divine deliberation and creation. Kvanvig develops a coherent theistic outlook which reconciles a traditional, high conception of deity, with full providential control over all aspects of creation, with a concep…Read more
-
125The confusion over foundationalismPhilosophia 16 (3-4): 345-354. 1986.Foundationalism came under attack in two areas in the first half of this century. First, some doubted whether the foundations were adequate to support the entire structure of knowledge, and second, the doctrine of the Agiven@ came under serious attack. = However, many epistemologists were not convinced that foundationalism was to be abandoned even if the criticisms were granted. According to these epistemologist, far from having shown that foundationalism itself was at fault, the critics of foun…Read more
-
60II—Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Millar on the Value of KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 83-99. 2011.Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge
-
116Tennant on knowabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4). 1999.The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.
-
7The Analogy Argument for a Limited Account of OmniscienceInternational Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2): 129-137. 1989.
-
14Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume (edited book)Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.
-
The Swamping Problem is one of the central problems in the new valuedriven approach to epistemology that has arisen recently. Issues concerning epistemic value, however, are not new. We can find them first in Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno have a discussion about what type of guide one should prefer if one wants to get to Larissa. The first suggestion is that one should want a guide who knows the way, but Socrates notes that a guide with true opinions will work just as well. Meno…Read more
-
The valueof know ledgeis external to itIn Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge, Routledge. pp. 37. 2008.
-
145Contrastivism and closureSocial Epistemology 22 (3). 2008.This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed
-
72Zagzebski on Justification (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 191--196. 2000.The heart of the epistemological interest of Zagzebski’s book is found in the tasks of clarifying the natures of justification and knowledge in terms of the intellectual virtues. It is in virtue of undertaking this task that Zagzebski presents a version of virtue epistemology. Though the book has several interesting features apart from this task, I want to argue that in its fundamental tasks, the book is a failure. In particular, I will argue that Zagzebski’s virtue account of justification is i…Read more
-
58Epistemic JustificationIn Sven Bernecker Duncan Pritchard (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 25--36. 2010.
-
52Theories of Providence and CreationRes Philosophica 90 (1): 49-67. 2013.Einstein was notoriously confident that God doesn’t play dice with the universe. Perhaps it is a confidence born of a deeper modal presumption: that Godcouldn’t play dice with the universe. If so, such confidence almost certainly disappoints. Even if God doesn’t play dice with the universe, he might. Thus arises the issue here addressed: what implications does this datum have for a proper understanding of divine providence? My interest is in theories that aim to present complete theories of prov…Read more
St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |