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90Temporal Externalism: A Taxonomy, an Articulation, and a DefenceJournal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1). 2014.I argue that the semantic content of thoughts and the linguistic meaning of expressions are things with a history in the sense that they can be made fully intelligible only from the point of view of the future. I defend this position by articulating a version of a view known in the philosophy of language as temporal externalism. Temporal externalism about content is the view that the content of a subject’s thoughts and utterances at a time t depends on features of the linguistic practices of her…Read more
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131Collective amnesia and epistemic injusticeImperfect Cognitions. 2016.Alessandra Tanesini is a Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University working on epistemology and philosophy of language. In this post she summarises some of her recent work on collective amnesia and epistemic injustice.
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39Under-represented groups in philosophy (26th-27th November 2010)Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 243-249. 2012.
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28Philosophy of Language a–ZEdinburgh University Press. 2007.These thorough, authoritative yet concise alphabetical guides introduce the central concepts of the various branches of philosophy. Written by established philosophers, they cover both traditional and contemporary terminology.
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92Intentionality and the externalism versus internalism debateAbstracta 4 (S2): 45-53. 2008.In their excellent book The Phenomenological Mind Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi demonstrate that analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science have much to learn from work conducted in the phenomenological tradition. In particular, they show how discussions about embodied cognition, about the self, and about mind-reading could be greatly enhanced if the lessons of phenomenology were heeded to. However, their discussion of the structure of intentionality is, in my view, less successful in th…Read more
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434Teaching Virtue: Changing AttitudesLogos and Episteme 7 (4): 503-527. 2016.In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Virtue Epistemology |
Social Epistemology |
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |