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123A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianismPhilosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpati…Read more
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473Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilitiesPhilosophical Review 104 (2): 247-61. 1995.
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1Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examplesIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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80Blameworthiness, non-robust alternatives, and the principle of alternative expectationsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1). 2005.
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71A problem for the eternity solutionInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2): 87-95. 1991.
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582Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of DecisionsFaith and Philosophy 12 (1): 113-118. 1995.Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt’s well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent’s decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer’s argument has consequently led various philosophers to develop libertarian accounts of …Read more
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1032A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?Analysis 76 (3): 296-306. 2016.In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in gen…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |