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14Avoidability and LibertarianismFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 415-421. 1996.Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s fir…Read more
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1099Fischer against the dilemma defence: the defence prevailsAnalysis 73 (2): 283-295. 2013.In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PA…Read more
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79Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternative possibilitiesIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 53--73. 2003.
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1568On the Luck Objection to LibertarianismIn Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 94-115. 2015.Abstract Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situat…Read more
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47Two fallacious objections to Adams' soft/hard fact distinctionPhilosophical Studies 57 (1). 1989.
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219Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt ScenariosJournal of Philosophy 103 (4): 163-187. 2006.
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120A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianismPhilosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpati…Read more
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473Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilitiesPhilosophical Review 104 (2): 247-61. 1995.
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Philosophy of Mind |
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Philosophy of Mind |