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892A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?Analysis 76 (3): 296-306. 2016.In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in gen…Read more
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248Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (edited book)Ashgate. 2003.This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
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22In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action IndividuationDialectica 43 (3): 281-288. 1989.
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21Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous MonismGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 95-100. 1992.Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger C…Read more
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963The Direct Argument and the burden of proofAnalysis 72 (1): 25-36. 2012.Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed
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148In Defense of Non-Causal LibertarianismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1): 1-14. 2018.Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agen…Read more
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655Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft factsReligious Studies 38 (1): 77-88. 2002.John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue…Read more
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231Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further lookPhilosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 181-202. 2000.
Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |