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578Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesFaith and Philosophy 17 (2): 249-254. 2000.In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type sce…Read more
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36Contra Snapshot OckhamismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2). 1996.Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction can succeed. Thus, it is surprising that Fischer's new account, too, turns out to be …Read more
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15Avoidability and LibertarianismFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 415-421. 1996.Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s fir…Read more
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1122Fischer against the dilemma defence: the defence prevailsAnalysis 73 (2): 283-295. 2013.In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PA…Read more
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79Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternative possibilitiesIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. pp. 53--73. 2003.
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1582On the Luck Objection to LibertarianismIn Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 94-115. 2015.Abstract Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situat…Read more
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47Two fallacious objections to Adams' soft/hard fact distinctionPhilosophical Studies 57 (1). 1989.
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