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21In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action IndividuationDialectica 43 (3): 281-288. 1989.
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20Blameworthiness, Non‐robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative ExpectationsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1): 292-306. 2005.
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20Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous MonismGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 95-100. 1992.Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger C…Read more
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20Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of ResponsibilityJournal of Philosophy 90 (2): 98. 1993.
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15Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous MonismGrazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1): 95-100. 1992.Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist the stronger C…Read more
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14Avoidability and LibertarianismFaith and Philosophy 13 (3): 415-421. 1996.Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s fir…Read more
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13Zimmerman on moral responsibility, obligation and alternate possibilitiesAnalysis 54 (4): 285-287. 1994.
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1Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examplesIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesIn Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2003.
Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |