-
312On linking dispositions and conditionalsMind 117 (465): 59-84. 2008.Analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements famously confront the problems of finks and masks. We argue that conditional analyses of dispositions, even those tailored to avoid finks and masks, face five further problems. These are the problems of: (i) Achilles' heels, (ii) accidental closeness, (iii) comparatives, (iv) explaining context sensitivity, and (v) absent stimulus conditions. We conclude by offering a proposal that avoids all seven of these problems.
-
237Intentional action and the unintentional fallacyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4): 524-534. 2011.Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility
-
213A gradable approach to dispositionsPhilosophical Quarterly 57 (226). 2007.Previous theories of the relationship between dispositions and conditionals are unable to account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees. We propose a fix for this problem that has the added benefit of avoiding the classic problems of finks and masks.
-
230The argument from temporary intrinsicsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3). 2003.The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
-
178Humean supervenience and personal identityPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (221): 582-593. 2005.Humeans hold that the nomological features of our world, including causal facts, are determined by the global distribution of fundamental properties. Since persistence presupposes causation, it follows that facts about personal identity are also globally determined. I argue that this is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the doctrine of Humean supervenience should therefore be rejected
Bellingham, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Meta-Ethics |