Ami Harbin

Against the background of the exclusion of many feminist methodologies from mainstream philosophy, and in light of the methodological challenges of providing accounts of experience responsive to the lives of agents, in this paper I return to early feminist philosophers of emotion to highlight how they anticipate and respond to methodological criticisms. Sue Campbell (1956–2011) was one philosopher who used methodological quandaries to strengthen her account of the formation and expression of feelings (Campbell ). By rereading selected texts together intentionally for their structural and methodological strategies, I emphasize the power of formal characteristics to make insightful claims about experience possible. I consider how feminist philosophers of “experienced agency” can put these strategies to use in facing ongoing methodological criticisms, taking as a case study an account of how it can feel to act responsibly against injustice

Neglect of the moral promise of disorientation is a persistent gap in even the most sophisticated philosophies of embodiment. In this article, I begin to correct this neglect by expanding our sense of the range and nature of disoriented experience and proposing new visions of disorientation as benefiting moral agency. Disorientations are experienced through complex interactions of corporeal, affective, and cognitive processes, and are characterized by feelings of shock, surprise, unease, and discomfort; felt disorientations almost always make us unsure of how to go on. I argue that experiences of disorientation can strengthen the moral agency of individuals. I begin by clarifying experiences of felt ease and orientation. I then characterize disoriented embodiment by investigating select experiences that often involve or accompany disorientation, focusing throughout on how disorientation prompts changes in motivation and action. I conclude by charting how disoriented embodiments can help individuals become better moral agents overall, in part by challenging norms that restrict embodiment and undermining dualistic conceptions of the self.

This article introduces questions in psychiatric ethics regarding the substantial field of qualitative and quantitative research into ‘posttraumatic growth’, which investigates how, after devastating experiences, individuals can come to feel that they have developed warmer relationships, increased spirituality, or a clearer vision of their priorities. In one area of this research, researchers of posttraumatic growth outline strategies for clinicians interested in assisting their patients in achieving such growth. In this article, I articulate two ethical concerns about this account of posttraumatic growth and the practice of growth-oriented therapy. The first is a concern about the status and effects of the ideal of posttraumatic health implicit in their account, and the second a concern about the ethical implications of the clinical recommendations for the post-trauma patient. I argue for the need for more attention to the hazardous implications of relating to patients as though they are on their way to, and themselves largely in control of, their own posttraumatic growth