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Larry Laudan

University of Texas at Austin
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    101
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    4
  •  News and Updates
    72

 More details
  • University of Texas at Austin
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty (Part-time)
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1965
Areas of Specialization
20th Century Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Law
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (101)
  •  99
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (2): 154-157. 1969.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  149
    A Confutation of Convergent Realism
    In Yuri Balashov & Alex Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. pp. 211. 2001.
    Theory Change
  •  92
    Damn the Consequences!
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (2). 1995.
  •  63
    Put “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” out to pasture?
    In Andrei Marmor (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, Routledge. pp. 317. 2012.
  •  26
    The rules of trial, political morality and the costs of error: or, Is proof beyond a reasonable doubt doing more harm than good?
    In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  • Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence
    Philosophy 73 (283): 136-139. 1998.
  •  5
    Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology
    Cambridge University Press. 2006.
    Beginning with the premise that the principal function of a criminal trial is to find out the truth about a crime, Larry Laudan examines the rules of evidence and procedure that would be appropriate if the discovery of the truth were, as higher courts routinely claim, the overriding aim of the criminal justice system. Laudan mounts a systematic critique of existing rules and procedures that are obstacles to that quest. He also examines issues of error distribution by offering the first integrate…Read more
    Beginning with the premise that the principal function of a criminal trial is to find out the truth about a crime, Larry Laudan examines the rules of evidence and procedure that would be appropriate if the discovery of the truth were, as higher courts routinely claim, the overriding aim of the criminal justice system. Laudan mounts a systematic critique of existing rules and procedures that are obstacles to that quest. He also examines issues of error distribution by offering the first integrated analysis of the various mechanisms - the standard of proof, the benefit of the doubt, the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof - for implementing society's view about the relative importance of the errors that can occur in a trial.
    Criminal Law
  •  135
    Anomalous anomalies
    Philosophy of Science 48 (4): 618-619. 1981.
    Theory Change
  •  427
    Normative naturalism
    Philosophy of Science 57 (1): 44-59. 1990.
    Normative naturalism is a view about the status of epistemology and philosophy of science; it is a meta-epistemology. It maintains that epistemology can both discharge its traditional normative role and nonetheless claim a sensitivity to empirical evidence. The first sections of this essay set out the central tenets of normative naturalism, both in its epistemic and its axiological dimensions; later sections respond to criticisms of that species of naturalism from Gerald Doppelt, Jarrett Leplin …Read more
    Normative naturalism is a view about the status of epistemology and philosophy of science; it is a meta-epistemology. It maintains that epistemology can both discharge its traditional normative role and nonetheless claim a sensitivity to empirical evidence. The first sections of this essay set out the central tenets of normative naturalism, both in its epistemic and its axiological dimensions; later sections respond to criticisms of that species of naturalism from Gerald Doppelt, Jarrett Leplin and Alex Rosenberg
    Naturalized EpistemologyArguments For and Against Scientific Realism
  •  87
    Scientific Realism: A Critical ReappraisalNicholas Rescher
    Isis 80 (4): 745-746. 1989.
    Standard Scientific RealismConvergent RealismHistory of Science, MiscScientific Realism, Misc
  •  160
    Invention and justification
    Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 320-322. 1983.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
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