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Larry Laudan

University of Texas at Austin
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    101
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    4
  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • University of Texas at Austin
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty (Part-time)
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1965
Areas of Specialization
20th Century Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Law
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (101)
  • „A Confutation of Convergent Realism “in Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg
    In Yuri Balashov & Alex Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. pp. 211--33. 2001.
    Convergent Realism
  • Progress and Its Problems: Towards a New Theory of Scientific Growth
    Synthese 42 (3): 443-464. 1979.
    Scientific Progress
  •  205
    Towards a Reassessment of Comte’s ‘Methode Positive’
    Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 35-53. 1971.
    In this study of Auguste Comte's philosophy of science, an attempt is made to explicate his views on such methodological issues as explanation, prediction, induction and hypothesis. Comte's efforts to resolve the dual problems of demarcation and meaning led to the enunciation of principles of verifiability and predictability. Comte's hypothetico-deductive method is seen to permit conjectures dealing with unobservable entities
    Auguste ComtePhilosophy of HistoryInductive Reasoning
  •  199
    Is reasonable doubt reasonable?
    Legal Theory 9 (4): 295-331. 2003.
    It is difficult, if not impossible, to so define the term as to satisfy a subtle and metaphysical mind, bent on the detection of some point, however attenuated, upon which to hang a criticism. —Supreme Court of Virginia 1
    Philosophy of Law
  •  161
    Science and Relativism: Some key controversies in the philosophy of science
    University of Chicago Press. 1990.
    Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science Larry Laudan. the mouths of my realist, relativist, and positivist. (By contrast, there is at least one person who hews to the line I have my prag- matist defending.) But I have gone to some  ...
    Philosophy of Science, General WorksEpistemic Relativism, MiscArguments For and Against Scientific R…Read more
    Philosophy of Science, General WorksEpistemic Relativism, MiscArguments For and Against Scientific Realism, MiscAlternatives to Scientific Realism, Misc
  •  206
    Ex-huming Hacking (review)
    Erkenntnis 13 (1): 417-435. 1978.
    Entity RealismHume: Philosophy of ProbabilityHume and Other PhilosophersBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  115
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3): 154-157. 1968.
  • Prueba y estándares de prueba en el Derecho
    with Juan A. Cruz Parcero
    Critica 43 (129): 93-98. 2011.
  •  201
    Dominance and the disunity of method: Solving the problems of innovation and consensus
    with Rachel Laudan
    Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 221-237. 1989.
    It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustra…Read more
    It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustrating how a rational community with divergent standards can encourage innovation and eventually reach consensus, recent developments in geophysics are discussed at some length
    Scientific ProgressDecision Theory and Hypothesis TestingSociology of ScienceScientific Metamethodol…Read more
    Scientific ProgressDecision Theory and Hypothesis TestingSociology of ScienceScientific MetamethodologyEpistemology of Disagreement
  •  2
    Progress or rationality
    In David Papineau (ed.), The philosophy of science, Oxford University Press. pp. 194--214. 1996.
    Scientific Progress
  •  95
    The Philosophy of Progress..
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978. 1978.
    Scientific Progress
  •  55
    A problem-solving approach to scientific progress
    In Ian Hacking (ed.), Scientific revolutions, Oxford University Press. 1981.
    Scientific Progress
  •  12535
    The Demise of the Demarcation Problem
    In Robert S. Cohen & Larry Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum, D. Reidel. pp. 111--127. 1983.
    Demarcation of ScienceScience and Religion
  •  170
    Science and Values
    with Harold I. Brown
    Philosophical Review 95 (3): 439. 1986.
    Science and Values
  •  60
    Methodology's Prospects
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986. 1986.
    For positivists and post-positivists alike, methodology had a decidedly suspect status. Positivists saw methodological rules as stipulative conventions, void of any empirical content. Post-positivists (especially naturalistic ones) see such rules as mere descriptions of how research is conducted, carrying no normative force. It is argued here that methodological rules are fundamentally empirical claims, but ones which have significant normative bite. Methodology is thus divorced both from founda…Read more
    For positivists and post-positivists alike, methodology had a decidedly suspect status. Positivists saw methodological rules as stipulative conventions, void of any empirical content. Post-positivists (especially naturalistic ones) see such rules as mere descriptions of how research is conducted, carrying no normative force. It is argued here that methodological rules are fundamentally empirical claims, but ones which have significant normative bite. Methodology is thus divorced both from foundationalism and conventionalism.
  •  179
    Some problems facing intuitionist meta-methodologies
    Synthese 67 (1). 1986.
    Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for…Read more
    Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for historical (as opposed to contemporary or imaginary) test cases. What all such positions lack is a base from which to inform, criticize, or restructure our core methodological intuitions. To acquiesce in this is to deny that exemplary cases can serve the sort of warranting role required for intuitionism. This point is reinforced by a series of reasons for denying the warranting role of pre-analytic judgments of rationality. These reasons point the way toward an improved approach to meta-methodology.
    Metaepistemology
  •  43
    How the Social Contract Is Ignored and Undermined by the Rules of Trial, and How We Might Fix that Problem - Sessió 4
    Quarta sessió del Seminari de Larry Lawdan.
    Social Contract, Misc
  •  106
    Reply to Mary Hesse
    The Monist 55 (3): 525-525. 1971.
    I am happy to see Dr. Hesse’s clarification of her earlier discussion of consilience. I shall not comment here on her interesting, if controversial, thesis that a confirmed theory confers no likelihood on its untested entailments, except insofar as the latter are analogous to previously confirmed entailments of that theory. It would be premature to comment on the thesis until Hesse has spelled out in more detail her account of analogy.
    The Knowledge ArgumentGeneral Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  135
    Epistemic Crises and Justification Rules
    Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2): 271-317. 2001.
    Justification
  •  129
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (2): 154-157. 1967.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  35
    Waves, Particles, Independent Tests and the Limits of Inductivism
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992. 1992.
    This paper seeks to show that Achinstein's recent attempt to establish that both parties to the wave-particle debate in 19th-century optics were Bayesian conditionalizers forces us to ignore several of the key conceptual issues in that controversy-not least the role of the vera causa principle and, more important still, the role of positive evidence in securing acceptance for the wave theory of light.
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc
  • Comte
    In Noretta Koertge (ed.), Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Charles Scribner’s Sons. pp. 3--375. 2008.
    Auguste Comte
  •  142
    Thoughts on HPS: 20 years later
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20 (1): 9-13. 1989.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsPhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  199
    Aim-less epistemology?
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2): 315-322. 1990.
    MetaepistemologyEvolutionary EpistemologyNormativity and NaturalismNaturalism, MiscRationalityScient…Read more
    MetaepistemologyEvolutionary EpistemologyNormativity and NaturalismNaturalism, MiscRationalityScientific Progress
  •  87
    Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth
    Erkenntnis 15 (1): 91-103. 1980.
  • The Book of Risks: Fascinating Facts about the Chances We Take Every Day
    with Kristin Shrader-Frechette
    Philosophy of Science 64 (3): 515. 1997.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  211
    II.1 The Pseudo-Science of Science?
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (2): 173-198. 1981.
    Philosophy of Social ScienceSociology of Science
  •  420
    Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate
    University of California Press. 1984.
    Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science
    Science and ValuesScientific TruthScientific Progress
  •  114
    For Method: or, Against Feyerabend
    In James Robert Brown & Jürgen Mittelstrass (eds.), An Intimate Relation: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Presented to Robert E. Butts on His 60th Birthday (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), Springer. 1989.
    Paul Feyerabend
  •  99
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (2): 154-157. 1969.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
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