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86Problems, truth, and consistencyStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 13 (1): 73-80. 1982.
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The methodological foundations of Mach's anti-atomism and their historical rootsIn Peter K. Machamer & Robert G. Turnbull (eds.), Motion and Time, Space and Matter, Ohio State University Press. pp. 390--417. 1976.
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„A Confutation of Convergent Realism “in Yuri Balashov and Alex RosenbergIn Yuri Balashov & Alex Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. pp. 211--33. 2001.
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Progress and Its Problems: Towards a New Theory of Scientific GrowthSynthese 42 (3): 443-464. 1979.
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206Towards a Reassessment of Comte’s ‘Methode Positive’Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 35-53. 1971.In this study of Auguste Comte's philosophy of science, an attempt is made to explicate his views on such methodological issues as explanation, prediction, induction and hypothesis. Comte's efforts to resolve the dual problems of demarcation and meaning led to the enunciation of principles of verifiability and predictability. Comte's hypothetico-deductive method is seen to permit conjectures dealing with unobservable entities
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199Is reasonable doubt reasonable?Legal Theory 9 (4): 295-331. 2003.It is difficult, if not impossible, to so define the term as to satisfy a subtle and metaphysical mind, bent on the detection of some point, however attenuated, upon which to hang a criticism. —Supreme Court of Virginia 1
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161Science and Relativism: Some key controversies in the philosophy of scienceUniversity of Chicago Press. 1990.Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science Larry Laudan. the mouths of my realist, relativist, and positivist. (By contrast, there is at least one person who hews to the line I have my prag- matist defending.) But I have gone to some ...
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201Dominance and the disunity of method: Solving the problems of innovation and consensusPhilosophy of Science 56 (2): 221-237. 1989.It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustra…Read more
Areas of Specialization
| 20th Century Philosophy |
| General Philosophy of Science |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Law |
| General Philosophy of Science |