Larry Laudan

Este artigo, originalmente publicado em History of Science, vol. 7 , pp. 1-63, contém talvez a mais completa bibliografia existente sobre as teorias do método, além de fornecer preciosas indicações para o seu uso e para o estudo da história da metodologia em geral. Agradecemos ao Professor Larry Laudan por ter preparado, especialmente para a tradução brasileira, um suplemento bibliográfico contendo muitos títulos novos. Embora o texto do ensaio original permaneça praticamente inalterado, algumas notas foram modificadas, de maneira a incluírem referências à bibliografia suplementar. Óbvios erros de impressão da edição original foram suprimidos. Na apresentação da bibliografia seguimos, com poucas modificações, as convenções do original

1. Introduction. The papers by Hellman and Mayo offer up a rich menu of problems and proposed solutions, so there is much here for a friendly critic to fasten on. In order to bring a modicum of focus to my commentary, I shall limit my remarks to the Duhem problem and its radiations in epistemology and methodology. Both Mayo and Hellman claim to have solutions to that hoary old problem and they tout these solutions as key indicators of the explanatory power of their respective technical epistemologies, whether Bayesian or Neyman/Pearsonian. Like Mayo, I shall be arguing that the Bayesian treatment of Duhem's problem is no solution at all; that, indeed, it fails to grapple with the core challenges posed by the purported ambiguities of falsification. My response to Mayo's more detailed, and I think more right-headed, treatment of the Duhem problem will be more complex. While I believe that she is moving in the right direction in many respects, I think that she fails to see one key dimension of the Duhemian conundrum. Indeed, she risks solving not Duhem's problem but quite a different one. I shall gently try to encourage her to steer her way back towards the central task.