Emanuela Ceva

This paper aims to outline the essential structural traits that a procedural theory of justice for the management of conflicts about values should display in order to combine open-endedness and cogency. To this purpose, it offers an investigation into the characteristics of procedural justice through a critical assessment of John Rawl’s taxonomy of prodeduralism, in terms of perfect, imperfect and pure procedural justice. Given the concessions the two former kinds of proceduralism make to substantive theories, and the potentially misleading characterisation Rawls gave of pure procedural theories of justice, it reformulates the latter category in terms of impure proceduralism. In this case, the theory is required not to pose substantive constraints on the qualities of just outcomes, but is, rather, expected to provide a transcontextually applicable account of the qualities of just procedures on the basis of an independent criterion of justice.

This paper addresses the problem of the foundation of a procedural and minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing. This approach may be summarised in the ‘principle of adversary argument’ (the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard). In particular, I intend to test whether this principle may provide the bases for a conception of justice applicable to conflicts of value in politics. More precisely, the considerations I shall offer aim to answer the following question: ‘How should fair hearing (and in particular fair hearing qua listening to the other side) be construed and justified in order to provide the bases for addressing value conflicts justly?’. To this end, I contend that previous efforts to argue for the principle of adversary argument, especially those offered by Stuart Hampshire, have failed to provide genuinely universal and normatively cogent foundations for it. However, I submit that such foundations are nonetheless derivable from a basic idea of procedural equality which all participants in conflicts of value could be thought to endorse.

The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) has been the object of many studies in politics, law, and economics focusing on institutional design problems. This paper contributes to such studies by accounting for the argumentative nature and sophisticated features of the DSS through a philosophical analysis of the procedures through which it is articulated. Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory is used as a hermeneutic device to disentangle the types of ‘orientations’ (compromise, consensus, and mutual understanding) pertaining to DSS procedures. We show that these latter are oriented primarily to put the parties in a position to reach mutual understanding. Such an orientation is no mere idiosyncrasy of the DSS but is the only one consistently conducive to the WTO's general aims, in response to the various types of disputes that may arise between its Members. Before closing, we bring our procedural considerations to bear on the reform proposals of the DSS.