Michael Richard Ayers

Cover -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Probability And Possibility For Choice -- 1 Introductory -- 2 A Theory About Personal Power -- 3 A Criticism Of Keynes -- 4 Some More Theories About Personal Power -- 5 An Analogy Between Two Kinds Of Possibility -- 3 Probability And Natural Powers -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The Relation Between Epistemic And Natural Possibility -- 3 A Criticism Of The Doctrine That 'Probable' Is Ambiguous -- 4 A Comparison Of Possibility With Probability -- 4 Some Unobservable Properties -- 1 Introductory -- 2 Certainty, Necessity And Hume -- 3 Epistemology And Determinism -- 4 An Analysis Proposed And Defended -- 5 Power And Law -- 5 Some Puzzles About Potentiality -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The idea of a 'circumstance' -- 3 The Distinction Between Intrinsic And Extrinsic Properties -- 4 The Refutation Of Actualism -- 5 The Refutation Of The Theory That 'All Power Is Conditional' -- 6 The Powers Of People Andthe Powers Of Things -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The Distinction Between Natural And Personal Power -- 3 The Refutation Of Ryle's Dispositionalist Account Of Human Capacities -- 7 IFS And Cans -- 1 Introductory -- 2 The Refutation Of The Theory That All Personal Power is Conditional -- 3 A Refutation Of The Orthodox Account Of 'I Can', As Equivalent To A Conditional Statement -- 4 A Contradiction In Dispositionalism -- 5 Further Objections To The Orthodox View -- 6 The Verification Of 'I Can': More About Trying -- 8 Deliberation, Freedom And Meaning -- 1 Introductory -- 2 More About Possibility And The Context Of Deliberation -- And About The Relation Between Power And Will -- 3 On Not Being Able To Help It: A: Discussion Of The Relationship Between Power And Responsibility -- 4 On The Meaning Of Words Like 'Can'

No doubt most philosophers who spend time on the history of philosophy are familiar with that question asked to embarrass (and liable to be asked by scientists in particular) why the history of the subject should be thought a significant part of the subject itself. Either there is progress in philosophy, it is said, or there is not. If there is progress, why the laborious backward glances? How can the past be so important? Why aren’t philosophers like psychologists, given perhaps a short historical orientation before being brought up to the nitty-gritty of the present? If, on the other hand, there is no progress, if we might as well be discussing Locke as Quine, doesn’t that imply that philosophy consists in a set of questions for which there is no way of establishing even that some answers are better than others? Wouldn’t it be more profitable to pursue questions to which at least provisional answers can be established, approximating to the truth? Wouldn’t it be better to be a scientist?

‘Empiricism’ has become for many a dirty word, and many writers have in mind the kind of neo-Humean Positivism that is the target of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, or Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception. But examination of the Empiricist tradition before Hume uncovers views that do not involve anything like the much-abused “Myth of the Given” or twentieth-century sensedatum theory. This paper identifiesthe particular line of seventeenth-century thought that eventually gave rise to sense-datum theory, and discusses other notions of experience that avoid it. The aim of this history lesson is to point to the possibility of an essentially empiricist approach today, an approach that avoids the neo-idealism or conceptualism of popular modern alternatives to sensedatum theory.

The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy offers a uniquely comprehensive and authoritative overview of early-modern philosophy written by an international team of specialists. As with previous Cambridge histories of philosophy the subject is treated by topic and theme, and since history does not come packaged in neat bundles, the subject is also treated with great temporal flexibility, incorporating frequent reference to medieval and Renaissance ideas. The basic structure of the volumes corresponds to the way an educated seventeenth-century European might have organised the domain of philosophy. Thus, the history of science, religious doctrine, and politics feature very prominently. The narrative that unfolds begins with an intellectual world dominated by a synthesis of Aristotelianism and scholastic philosophy, but by the end of the period the mechanistic or 'corpuscularian' philosophy has emerged and exerted its full impact on traditional metaphysics, ethics, theology, logic, and epistemology.

Philosophers debate whether all, some or none of the represcntational content of our sensory experience is conccptual, but the technical term "concept" has different uses. It is commonly linked more or less closely with the notions of judgdment and reasoning, but that leaves open the possibility that these terms share a systematic ambiguity or indeterminacy. Donald Davidson, however, holds an unequivocal and consistent, if paradoxical view that there are strictly speaking no psychological states with representational or intentional content except the propositional attitudes of language users, since thc source or fundamental bearer of intentionality is the employed sentence. Accordingly he claims that what has content in ordinary sense experience is not sensation, but propositional belief caused, but not justified, by sensation. John McDowell, sharing some ofDavidson's premises,holds a less paradoxical, but (l will argue) equivocal and incoherent view that post-infantile human sensory expcrience must have content in so far as it is what grounds perceptual belief but that this content is itself conceptual or propositional, dependent on language and culture. Reasons are givcn in the present article for rejecting both views, and their common premises. It is argued that perceptual or sensory states have intentional content which is no more conceptual or propositional than the world is. Recognition that perceptual content and conceptual content are, in a certain unsurprising way incommensurable allows for a more realistic understanding of the relationship between Language and the world as we experience it.

The thesis of this paper concerns the fundamental role of "ordinary objects" with respect to the structure of natural language. It ascribes their role as basic objects of reference to their being both natural and "given" individuals. Section 1 will summarize that idea. Further argument will be offered in Section 2. An objection appealing to physical theory will be answered in Section 3. Sections 4, 5, and 6 consider the implications of the thesis for current theories of the identity of "ordinary objects" over time. Section 4 deals with some traditional, paradoxical, but still influen tial arguments. Section 5 focuses on four-dimensionalism and the ontology of possible worlds. Section 6 examines the theory of David Wiggins, who recognizes that biological individuals, at least, are both natural and given, but who retains a form of conceptualism. Some remarks are made through out about the wider philosophical motivations of different approaches to the topic of identity, and about the nature of philosophical "analysis."

A scholastic-Cartesian schema faithfully maps ordinary, effective ways of dealing with intentionality; yet its apparent incoherence provokes philosophers into opting for one of two stances, 'Cartesian' or 'direct realist', seemingly incompatible, yet each seem in accord with ordinary thought. A wide range of canonical and current theories, realist, idealist and hybrid, essentially involve one option or the other. We should instead consider why the language of intentionality, with its apparent anomalies, works so well. Released from the obligation to opt for one stance over the other, we can identify a robust realism different in kind from anything currently on offer.

The author maintains that there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of counterfactual or unfulfilled conditional statements. there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of subjunctive conditionals. it exhausts the peculiar philosophical interest of these two classes of statement to explain why no philosopher ought to think them peculiarly interesting, and to explain why so many do. the author states that it should not be supposed that if he achieves his aim, all the difficulties and disputes which have occurred in discussions supposed to be about counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals will be settled in his article. this is because many of these difficulties have arisen, not out of features peculiar to either of these classes of statement, but out of features common to all conditional statements. (staff)

Consideration of the counting and reidentification of particulars leads naturally enough to the orthodox doctrine that, “on pain of indefiniteness,” an identity statement in some way involves or presupposes a general term or “covering concept”: i.e., that the principium individuationis or criterion of identity implied depends upon the kind of thing in question. Thus it is said that an auditor understands the question whether A is the same as B only in so far as he knows, however informally or implicitly, the answer to the supplementary question, “The same what?”