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19Nonmonotonic conditionals (A |∼ B) are formalizations of common sense expressions of the form “if A, normally B”. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted by a “high” coherent conditional probability, P(B|A) > .5. Two important properties are closely related to the nonmonotonic conditional: First, A |∼ B allows for exceptions. Second, the rules of the nonmonotonic system p guiding A |∼ B allow for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new premises. This study reports a series of three exper…Read more
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113Framing human inference by coherence based probability logicJournal of Applied Logic 7 (2): 206--217. 2009.We take coherence based probability logic as the basic reference theory to model human deductive reasoning. The conditional and probabilistic argument forms are explored. We give a brief overview of recent developments of combining logic and probability in psychology. A study on conditional inferences illustrates our approach. First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences conclude the paper.
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34A probability logical interpretation of fallaciesIn G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl & E. Hiebl (eds.), Rhetorische Wissenschaft: Rede Und Argumentation in Theorie Und Praxis, Lit. pp. 225--244. 2008.This chapter presents a probability logical approach to fallacies. A special interpretation of (subjective) probability is used, which is based on coherence. Coherence provides not only a foundation of probability theory, but also a normative standard of reference for distinguishing fallacious from non-fallacious arguments. The violation of coherence is sufficient for an argument to be fallacious. The inherent uncertainty of everyday life argumentation is captured by attaching degrees of belief …Read more
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41Probabilistic theories of reasoning need pragmatics too: Modulating relevance in uncertain conditionalsJournal of Pragmatics 43. 2011.According to probabilistic theories of reasoning in psychology, people's degree of belief in an indicative conditional `if A, then B' is given by the conditional probability, P(B|A). The role of language pragmatics is relatively unexplored in the new probabilistic paradigm. We investigated how consequent relevance aects participants' degrees of belief in conditionals about a randomly chosen card. The set of events referred to by the consequent was either a strict superset or a strict subset of t…Read more
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28Severe storm reports of the 17th century: Examples from the UK and FranceIn Niki Pfeifer & Katrin Pfeifer (eds.), Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Severe Storms (ECSS2013), 3 - 7 June 2013, Helsinki, Finland, . 2013.In this work we survey reports on selected severe storms of the 17th century. Specifically, we investigate a severe storm which was accompanied by a ball lightning phenomenon in Cornwall (UK) in 1640. The “fiery Ball”, which reportedly made a “ter[r]ible sound”, entered the church, broke stones and smashed windows. It made holes in stone walls and injured about 14 people. Furthermore, we report on a 1672 storm in Bedford (UK) that tore down houses, blew down stone walls and uprooted trees. We al…Read more
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47Inference in conditional probability logicKybernetika 42 (2): 391--404. 2006.An important field of probability logic is the investigation of inference rules that propagate point probabilities or, more generally, interval probabilities from premises to conclusions. Conditional probability logic (CPL) interprets the common sense expressions of the form “if . . . , then . . . ” by conditional probabilities and not by the probability of the material implication. An inference rule is probabilistically informative if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is not n…Read more
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7Editor's note: Special issue on Combining Probability and Logic to Solve Philosophical ProblemsJournal of Applied Logic 12 (3): 233-234. 2014.
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63Uncertain conditionals and counterfactuals in (non-)causal settingsIn G. Arienti, B. G. Bara & G. Sandini (eds.), Proceedings of the EuroAsianPacific Joint Conference on Cognitive Science (4th European Conference on Cognitive Science; 10th International Conference on Cognitive Science), Ceur Workshop Proceedings. pp. 651-656. 2015.Conditionals are basic for human reasoning. In our paper, we present two experiments, which for the first time systematically compare how people reason about indicative conditionals (Experiment 1) and counterfactual conditionals (Experiment 2) in causal and non-causal task settings (N = 80). The main result of both experiments is that conditional probability is the dominant response pattern and thus a key ingredient for modeling causal, indicative, and counterfactual conditionals. In the paper, …Read more