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27Cognition and natural disasters: Stimulating an environmental historical debateIn E. Vaz, A. Melo & C. J. de Melo (eds.), Proceedings of the Second World Congress of Environmental History. Environmental History in the Making, Springer. forthcoming.Modern cognitive and clinical psychology offer insight into how people deal with natural disasters. In my methodological paper, I make a strong case for incorporating experimental findings and theoretical concepts of modern psychology into environmental historical disaster research. I show how psychological factors may influence the production and interpretation of historical sources with respect to perceptions of and responses to disasters. While previous psychological approaches to history mos…Read more
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33Transitive reasoning with imprecise probabilitiesIn S. S. Destercke & T. Denoeux (eds.), Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2015), Springer Lnai 9161. pp. 95-105. 2015.We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Finally, we present the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by …Read more
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28Towards a mental probability logicPsychologica Belgica 45 (1): 71--99. 2005.We propose probability logic as an appropriate standard of reference for evaluating human inferences. Probability logical accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning with system p, and conditional syllogisms (modus ponens, etc.) are explored. Furthermore, we present categorical syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers, like the “most . . . ” quantifier. While most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies, we summarize our empirical studies on human nonmonotonic reasonin…Read more
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89Mental probability logicBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1): 98-99. 2009.We discuss O&C's probabilistic approach from a probability logical point of view. Specifically, we comment on subjective probability, the indispensability of logic, the Ramsey test, the consequence relation, human nonmonotonic reasoning, intervals, generalized quantifiers, and rational analysis
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197Experiments on Aristotle’s ThesisThe Monist 95 (2): 223-240. 2012.Two experiments (N1 = 141, N2 = 40) investigate two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis for the first time. Aristotle’s Thesis is a negated conditional, which consists of one propositional variable with a negation either in the antecedent (version 1) or in the consequent (version 2). This task allows us to infer if people interpret indicative conditionals as material conditionals or as conditional events. In the first experiment I investigate between-participants the two versions of Aristotle’s Thesi…Read more
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80Transitivity in coherence-based probability logicJournal of Applied Logic 14 46-64. 2016.We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Moreover, we prove the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by pro…Read more
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27Rational argumentation under uncertaintyIn G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl & E. Hiebl (eds.), Persuasion Und Wissenschaft: Aktuelle Fragestellungen von Rhetorik Und Argumentationstheorie, Lit. pp. 181--191. 2007.Common sense arguments are practically always about incomplete and uncertain information. We distinguish two aspects or kinds of uncertainty. The one is defined as a persons’ uncertainty about the truth of a sentence. The other uncertainty is defined as a persons’ uncertainty of his assessment of the truth of a sentence. In everyday life argumentation we are often faced with both kinds of uncertainty which should be distinguished to avoid misunderstandings among discussants. The paper presents a…Read more
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41The modus ponens (A -> B, A :. B) is, along with modus tollens and the two logically not valid counterparts denying the antecedent (A -> B, ¬A :. ¬B) and affirming the consequent, the argument form that was most often investigated in the psychology of human reasoning. The present contribution reports the results of three experiments on the probabilistic versions of modus ponens and denying the antecedent. In probability logic these arguments lead to conclusions with imprecise probabilities. In t…Read more