Jamie Lennox

A necessary condition for having a revolution named after you is that you are an innovator in your field. I argue that if Charles Darwin meets this condition, it is as a philosopher and methodologist. In 1991, I made the case for Darwin's innovative use of "thought experiment" in the "Origin." Here I place this innovative practice in the context of Darwin's methodological commitments, trace its origins back into Darwin's notebooks, and pursue Darwin's suggestion that it owes its inspiration to Charles Lyell.

In this article I defend an account of Meteorology IV as providing a material-level causal account of the emergence of uniform materials with a wide range of dispositional properties not found at the level of the four elements—the emergence of material complexity. I then demonstrate that this causal account is used in the Generation of Animals and Parts of Animals as part of the explanation of the generation of the uniform parts (tissues) and of their role in providing nonuniform parts (organs) with the dispositional properties needed to fulfill their functions.

Where does Aristotle stand in the debate between rationalism and empiricism? The locus classicus on this question, Posterior Analytics II. 19, seems clearly empiricist. Yet many commentators have resisted this conclusion. Here, I review their arguments and conclude that they rest in part on expectations for this text that go unfulfilled. I argue that this is because his views about norms of empirical inquiry are in the rich methodological passages in his scientific treatises. In support of this claim, I explore such passages in On Parts of Animals and De anima. I argue that they reach distinct, though complementary, conclusions about the norms governing zoological and psychological inquiries.

This essay outlines one aspect of a larger collaboration with John Beatty and Alan Love.2 The project’s focus is philosophical, but for reasons that will become clear momentarily, the method of approach is historical. All three of us share the conviction that philosophical issues concerning the foundations of the sciences are often illuminated by investigating their history. It is my hope that this paper both provides support for that thesis, and illustrates it. The focal philosophical issue can be stated in the form of a puzzle about contemporary discussions of the conceptual foundations of evolutionary theory. The role of the concepts of “chance” and “randomness” in that theory is a significant part of ..

A central difficulty in the way of understanding Spinoza's metaphysical system is that of reconciling two apparently contradictory theories of the causation of finite modes found in his Ethics. The easiest way to present the problem is to place these two accounts side by side.A. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must forever exist, and must be infinite; that is to say, through that attribute they are eternal and infinite. A thing which has been determined to any action was necessarily so determined by God. Together, these propositions entail that God is a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of any action, and that anything so determined is eternal and infinite. Compare these implications with the following.B. An individual thing or a thing which is finite and has determinate existence cannot exist nor be determined to action unless it be determined to existence and action by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause cannot exist nor be determined to action unless by another cause which is also finite and determined to existence and action, and so on, ad infinitum.

Aristotle is the first person in the history of science to see the study of nature as an articulated complex of interrelated, yet somewhat autonomous, investigations. Understanding why goes to the heart of what is philosophically distinctive about him. Why does Aristotle present the investigation of “the common cause of animal motion” as distinct and independent from a study of the causes of the different forms of animal locomotion, the announced project of De incessu animalium? This article examines the puzzling complexity of Aristotle's investigations of animals, which can offer insights into his metaphysics and epistemology. It first briefly considers the range of Aristotle's writings related to animals, including Historia animalium, Dissections, De partibus animalium, De motu animalium, De incessu animalium, De Anima, and Meteorologica IV. The article then looks at his views on the limits of teleology in biology.

Just before beginning his discussion of the nutritive soul, Aristotle asserts his Double Priority Principle (DPP): the objective correlate of each activity of the soul is prior to that activity, and each activity is prior to its corresponding capacity. This principle gives rise to a number of general puzzles (e. g., what sort of priority is being discussed, and is it the same priority in the two cases). But it also gives rise to a number of puzzles specific to the nutritive soul, resulting from Aristotle’s claim that the nutritive and reproductive functions are both functions of the same capacity of the soul, and indeed, that nutrition and reproduction are one and the same capacity. In this paper, intended as propaedeutic to the other essays in this volume, I lay out the puzzles arising from tensions between the DDP and Aristotle’s account of the nutritive soul, and in particular his claim that reproduction is a nutritive function.

It is often claimed that one of Darwin''s chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin''s closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin''s version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth century about Darwin''s attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin''s teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin''s explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations.