Emmanuel Renault

If it seems fully legitimate to introduce Marx in the contemporary discussion about recognition, it is more disputable to attribute to Marx an unified conception of recognition. There is no doubt that Marx hasn’t provided any systematic account of recognition, but he has tackled the issue of recognition from various points of view. Could these various points of view be unified in a general conception of recognition? This article claims that this is not the case since three accounts of recognition should be distinguished that are hardly compatible one with the other: one Feuerbachian account of recognition of the species being in the other, one account of recognition related to the dynamics of disrespect as social experience, and one account of recognition through social roles

Current debates on neo-liberal governmentality and the medicalization-psychologization of the social constantly refer to Foucault’s theory of biopolitics. I critically examine Foucault’s notions of biopolitics and liberalism as conveyed in his articles on the emergence of social medicine in the 19th century. My thesis is that the movement of sanitary reform is irreducible to the mere development of liberal governmentality and that the idea of social medicine was associated in the period with a critique of the normative principles of liberalism which remains relevant today

The interpretation of Marx’s references to work and to domination is a vexed question. Can we say that Marx criticizes capitalism in terms of its effects on work? Or does he criticize capitalism from the standpoint of those subject to domination, and with whom his position is one of solidarity? Or does he elaborate a description of the unprecedented transformations brought about in the relations of power, which the category of domination is unable to apprehend effectively? The article argues that these differences in interpretation are actually based on a series of false oppositions. Marx’s aim is in effect to articulate the question of the domination of work and the question of domination at work, insofar as he accords a position of political centrality to the connection between domination and work.

The concepts of globalisation and of neoliberalism are symptomatic of the transformations which have taken place in the way the question of social critique has been addressed. The contemporary period has witnessed the emergence of a protocol of social analysis in which political inquiry is linked to historical diagnosis, drawing on the categories of historical periodisation and of economic analysis. The debate is thus, to a certain degree, shifted to the terrain of Marxism. As for the latter, it is confronted with a new set of theoretical and political challenges.

This paper begins by defending the twofold relevance, political and theoretical, of the notion of social suffering. Social suffering is a notion politics cannot do without today, as it seems indispensable to describe all the aspects of contemporary injustice. As such, it has been taken up in a number of significant research programmes in different social sciences (sociology, anthropology, social psychology). The notion however poses significant conceptual problems as it challenges disciplinary boundaries traditionally set up to demarcate individual and social phenomena. I argue that philosophy has a role to play in the attempt to integrate the diverging perspectives stemming from the social sciences. I attempt to show that, as it engages with the social sciences to account for the conceptual and normative issues thrown open by the question of social suffering, philosophy in fact retrieves the very idea of critical theory, as a conjugated critique of social reality and of its knowledge. I conclude by showing how the question of social suffering then becomes a useful criterion to distinguish between the different existing approaches in critical theory

La pensée de Marx est célèbre pour ses différentes critiques critique de la philosophie hégélienne, de la philosophie critique, de la philosophie tout court, de la religion, de la politique, du socialisme utopique, de l'économie politique... Une telle insistance ne peut être fortuite, elle indique bien plutôt un projet théorique original, critique en ce qu'il se veut polémique, mais aussi en ce qu'il se veut non dogmatique. L'ouvrage, en s'attachant aux étapes principales de l'évolution intellectuelle de Marx, montre que toujours le motif critique reste constitutif, depuis la jeunesse, alors que Marx adhère à la philosophie critique des jeunes hégéliens, jusqu'à la maturité, lorsque Le Capital donne son couronnement à l'entreprise de la critique de l'économie politique. Il s'avère en fait qu'un même projet critique traverse les différentes étapes de l'œuvre, et qu'il constitue l'un des foyers à partir duquel elle doit être interprétée.

The Marxian concept of ideology has been subjected to various types of criticism. Some criticism derives from the concept’s internal difficulties. Other criticism stems from the historical evolution of ideological forms. The article argues that a shift which is often presented as an overcoming of ideology is rather to be seen as a transformation of ideology, which in turn calls for a transformation of our conceptions of ideology. The article thus focuses on the trend towards the replacement of a paradigm of justification by legitimation by a paradigm of justification by description.

La philosophie de la nature de l'Encyclopedie des sciences philosophiques fut, jusqu'a une date recente, presque ignoree par les etudes hegeliennes. Hegel s'y serait rendu coupable d'une pretention a concurrencer les sciences positives sur leur propre terrain et a rivaliser avec elles, en revelant a la fois son incomprehension de la scientificite la mieux etablie et la faible rationalite de son propre projet. Une lecture attentive permet de rectifier ces prejuges, en montrant non seulement que Hegel s'y trouve attentif et respectueux du savoir positif de son temps, mais encore qu'il tente d'y definir les modalites d'une collaboration methodologiquement reglee entre philosophie et sciences. En quoi consiste le projet d'une science speculative? En quoi consiste chez Hegel la deduction speculative de la verite? En quoi consiste la comprehension hegelienne du statut et des formes du discours des sciences de la nature? Quelle attitude la speculation doit-elle adopter face aux controverses scientifiques? C'est a ces questions que s'efforce de repondre cet ouvrage.

How does Marx refer to Work and to Domination ? The interpretation of Marx’s references to work and to domination is a vexed question. Can we say that Marx criticises capitalism in terms of its effects on work ? Or does he criticise capitalism from the standpoint of those subject to domination, and with whom his position is one of solidarity ? Or does he elaborate a description of the unprecedented transformations brought about in the relations of power, which the category of domination is unable to apprehend effectively ? The article argues that these differences in interpretation are actually based on a series of false oppositions. Marx’s aim is in effect to articulate the question of the domination of work and the question of domination at work, insofar as he accords a position of political centrality to the connection between domination and work

L’articolo ricostruisce la tradizione della teoria critica nella quale il con­cetto di individualità ricopre un ruolo centrale. Questo concetto è cruciale già in Marx, sia per la sua antropologia, sia per la sua teoria sociale e il suo retroterra normativo. La posizione centrale dell’individualità diviene più esplicita in Adorno, che ne intreccia aspetti critici e utopici. Infine, è in­dubbia l’appartenenza di Honneth a questa tradizione, che egli si propone di attualizzare in prospettiva so­cio-psicologica, tenendo nel debito conto le tra­sformazioni del capitalismo contemporaneo.This article reconstructs a tradition of critical theory in which the very no­tion of individuality plays a central role. Already in Marx, the notion of in­di­viduality is crucial in the anthropology, as well as in the social theory and in the normative background. The centrality of individuality becomes mo­re explicit in Adorno, as well as its intertwined critical and utopian as­pects. There is no doubt that Honneth belongs to this tradition and tries to ac­tualise it from a socio-psychological point of view and with due con­si­de­ration to the contemporary transformations of capitalism

The crises of neo-liberalism, modalities of revolt and adaptability The aim of the article is to locate the current crisis within the history of neo-liberalism with its successive crises. The authors point to the fact that the crisis is the latest in a series of financial and economic crises, to which must be added energy and food crises. The article analyses the social effects of neo-liberalism by way of its return to a logic focused on the production of absolute surplus-value, following the revolt of the financial bourgeoisie against the social State. It concludes with an examination of the effects of the various forms of resistance to neo-liberalism upon the modes of legitimation that are in operation. Focusing in particular on the situation in France, the article argues that the reactions to the crisis, between revolt and resignation, are to be explained by way of the structural effects of neo-liberalism and in terms of the crisis of legitimation now affecting it

Comment transformer les définitions communes de la justice sociale afin qu'elles puissent rendre compte des formes aujourd'hui les plus caractéristiques de l'injustice sociale? Comment leur faire rendre compte des souffrances de " ceux qui ont trop à dire pour pouvoir le dire "? Telles sont les questions auxquelles ce livre se propose de répondre. Dans une démarche originale, Emmanuel Renault reprend et élargit la théorie de la reconnaissance élaborée par le philosophe allemand Axel Honneth, afin de proposer une grammaire des luttes sociales mais aussi une grille d'analyse des injustices que ces luttes prennent rarement en charge. C'est par la reconnaissance que les autres et la société lui accordent que chacun peut bénéficier des conditions substantielles d'une vie digne d'être vécue. Inversement, les dénis de reconnaissance sont à l'origine de souffrances sociales et psychiques majeures. Dans cette perspective, l'auteur procède à un examen critique des théories contemporaines qui structurent notre pensée politique et sociale, proposées par J. Rawls, J. Habermas, M. Walzer et C. Taylor, P Bourdieu, T. Negri, etc. S'appuyant sur les travaux de la sociologie et la psychologie sociale qui analysent les mouvements sociaux, les restructurations du travail ou les souffrances engendrées par la précarisation ou par l'exclusion, il tente d'élaborer une théorie globale permettant d'éclairer la multiplicité des phénomènes étudiés. Ce livre soutient que la philosophie doit prendre l'injustice au sérieux, car c'est en elle que se déterminent les enjeux des discours sur la justice. Il propose ainsi une philosophie assumant sa dimension politique, reconnaissant qu'elle se meut à l'intérieur du monde réel et non simplement dans le ciel des idées. Il offre un argumentaire global au service de ceux qui font l'expérience quotidienne de l'injustice et sont en conséquence intéressés à la transformation de l'ordre social existant.

This paper contrasts the Hegelianism of contemporary neo-pragmatism and the Hegelianism of classical pragmatism as it has been reassessed in contemporary Deweyan scholarship. Drawing on Dewey’s interpretation of Hegel, this paper argues that Hegel’s theory of the spirit is in many aspects more akin to Dewey’s pragmatism than Brandom’s. The first part compares Dewey’s pragmatism with Hegel’s conceptions of experience and the theory/practice relation. The second part compares Dewey’s naturalism with Hegel’s theory of the relation between nature and spirit.

The purpose of this article is to bridge the gap between critical theory as understood in the Frankfurt school tradition on the one hand, and social ontology understood as a reflection on the ontological presuppositions of social sciences and social theories on the other. What is at stake is the type of social ontology that critical theory needs if it wants to tackle its main social ontological issue: that of social transformation. This paper’s claim is that what is required is neither a substantial social ontology, nor a relational social ontology, but a processual one. The first part of this article elaborates the distinction between substantial, relational and processual social ontologies. The second part analyzes the various ways in which this distinction can be used in social ontological discussions. Finally, the third part focuses on the various possible social ontological approaches to the issue of social transformation.