Yong Wang

Drawing on Yan’s novella Serve the People (2005), the author examines the metamorphosis of the titular master signifier that has served as a central moral mandate in the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological discourse. Relying on a Lacanian framework via Žižek’s and others’ writings, this paper attempts to show that totalitarian ideological transformation hinges on the organization of jouissance (enjoyment) that has undergone three ideological modes — proto-, post-, and neo-totalitarianism. In the first mode, the subject procures enjoyment from the symbolic order through a gesture of sacrifice. Due to the collapse of the imaginary of the Socialist New Man that sustains the totalitarian gaze, the post-totalitarian subject’s cynical distance from the “official” ideology functions as the very support for the effectiveness of the ideological apparatuses. Finally neo-totalitarianism is characterized as the inverse of proto-totalitarianism: the obscene underside that supports the totalitarian order is brought to the front stage as the new symbolic mandate to enjoy. The manifestations of such metamorphosis in literary and filmic works follow the path that starts from the sublime and ends at the obscene.

In the private benefits of control with the case, it has incentives for entrepreneurs; the same time, because of moral hazard, creditors can use to protect their control over the return, therefore, control of the creditors but also has the role acceptance. These two conflicting effects, debt financing will inevitably affect the arrangement of control. Debt financing, the best control of the arrangement depends on the control of the trade-off between the two roles, people generally believe that debt is not more control to the higher proportion of creditors. Control right has incentive effect on the entrepreneur so long he ensures his private benefits from that right, however, since the creditor may use control right to safeguard his returns in the case of moral hazard, it commits a encashment promise to the creditor as well. The conflicts between them may influence arrangement of control rights in debt financing. This paper holds that the best arrangement of control rights in debt financing depends on the tradeoff between its incentive and commitment effects, instead of the opinion that the more is the debt, the more control rights the creditor should get