Daniel Weiskopf

Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts. Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms. I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of genuinely cognitive explanations

Concept empiricists are committed to the claim that the vehicles of thought are re-activated perceptual representations. Evidence for empiricism comes from a range of neuroscientific studies showing that perceptual regions of the brain are employed during cognitive tasks such as categorization and inference. I examine the extant neuroscientific evidence and argue that it falls short of establishing this core empiricist claim. During conceptual tasks, the causal structure of the brain produces widespread activity in both perceptual and non-perceptual systems. I lay out several conditions on what is required for a neural state to be a realizer of the functional role played by concepts, and argue that no subset of this activity can be singled out as the unique neural vehicle of conceptual thought. Finally, I suggest that, while the strongest form of empiricism is probably false, the evidence is consistent with several weaker forms of empiricism

Christopher Gauker proposes that all cognition can be divided into nonconceptual image-based thought and conceptual language-based thought. The division between the two hinges on the representational powers of their respective mediums. I argue that a richer variety of representational states and processes is necessary in order to explain both human and nonhuman cognition. There are aspects of nonhuman cognition that cannot be explained simply by images, and there are aspects of human conceptual thought, particularly those dealing with causal reasoning, that push us towards positing abstract systems of representation that are neither imagistic nor linguistic. Conceptual thought, then, occurs in its own proprietary inner code, not in images or words