James Tully

The ways citizen participation and democracy are changing are poorly understood due to the dominance of theories inherited from the eighteenth century. Democratic citizenship can be better understood if critical reflection is re-oriented around the games of concrete freedom here and now as recommended by Hannah Arendt, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault and Quentin Skinner.This orientation brings to light two distinctive types of citizen freedom in the present: diverse forms of citizen participation and diverse practices of governance in which citizens participate.

An approach to political philosophy: Locke in contexts brings together Professor Tully's most important and innovative statements on Locke in a treatment of the latter's thought that is at once contextual and critical. The essays have been rewritten and expanded for this volume, and each seeks to understand a theme of Locke's political philosophy by interpreting it in light of the complex contexts of early modern European political thought and practice. These historical studies are then used in a variety of ways to gain critical perspectives on the assumptions underlying current debates in political philosophy and the history of political thought. The themes treated include government, toleration, discipline, property, aboriginal rights, individualism, power, labour, self-ownership, community, progress, liberty, participation, and revolution.

The two major schools of thought in Indigenous−settler relations on the ground, in the courts, in public policy, and in research are resurgence and reconciliation. Resurgence refers to practices of Indigenous self- determination and cultural renewal. Reconciliation refers to practices of reconciliation between Indigenous and settler nations as well as efforts to strengthen the relationship between Indigenous and settler peoples with the living earth and making that relationship the basis for both resurgence and Indigenous−settler reconciliation. Critically and constructively analyzing these two schools from a variety of perspectives and lived experiences, this volume connects both discourses to the ecosystem dynamics that animate the living earth. Resurgence and Reconciliation is a truly multidisciplinary work, blending law, political science, political economy, women’s studies, history, anthropology, ecology, sustainability, and climate change. Its dialogic approach strives to put these fields in conversation and draw out the connections and tensions between them. By using “earth teachings” to inform social practices, the editors and contributors offer a rich, innovative, and holistic way forward in response to the world’s most profound natural and social challenges. This timely volume shows how the complexities and interconnections of resurgence and reconciliation and the living earth are often overlooked in contemporary discourse and debate.

The Power of Nonviolence, written by Richard Bartlett Gregg in 1934 and revised in 1944 and 1959, is the most important and influential theory of principled or integral nonviolence published in the twentieth century. Drawing on Gandhi's ideas and practice, Gregg explains in detail how the organized power of nonviolence exercised against violent opponents can bring about small and large transformative social change and provide an effective substitute for war. This edition includes a major introduction by political theorist, James Tully, situating the text in its contexts from 1934 to 1959, and showing its great relevance today. The text is the definitive 1959 edition with a foreword by Martin Luther King, Jr. It includes forewords from earlier editions, the chapter on class struggle and nonviolent resistance from 1934, a crucial excerpt from a 1929 preliminary study, a biography and bibliography of Gregg, and a bibliography of recent work on nonviolence.

This is a German translation of '"Public Philosophy as a Critical Activity", chapter one of 'Public Philosophy in a New Key. It sets out a method of political philosophy that begins with a historical genealogy of political problem in the present. It then shows how this contectualised redescription of the problem can be approached by the citizens who are subject to it in ways that enable them to think and act differently with respect to it. The essay also explains the schools of political philosophy that have helped me to develop this method.

Les premières conférences John Robert Seeley, données par James Tully en 1994, traitaient des six types de demandes de reconnaissance culturelle qui sont au coeur des conflits les plus insolubles de notre époque : les associations supranationales, le nationalisme et le fédéralisme, les minorités linguistiques et ethniques, le féminisme, le multiculturalisme et l'autonomie gouvernementale des Autochtones. Ni les écoles actuelles du constitutionnalisme occidental moderne ni le constitutionnalisme post-moderne n'offrent d'outil équitable pour juger ces demandes diverses de reconnaissance parce qu'elles reposent sur des suppositions indéfendables, héritées de l'époque de l'impérialisme européen. Toutefois, en effectuant une étude critique et historique de quatre cents ans de constitutionnalisme européen et non européen, et en prêtant une attention particulière aux populations autochtones d'Amérique, James Tully élabore une philosophie et une pratique post-impériales du constitutionnalisme. Elles consistent à concilier des demandes de reconnaissance à travers le temps grâce à des dialogues constitutionnels qui permettent à des citoyens de se mettre d'accord sur des formes adéquates d'accommodements de leurs différences culturelles, guidées par des conventions constitutionnelles communes. Cette forme de constitutionnalisme a la capacité de résoudre des conflits de notre époque et d'apporter la paix au vingt et unième siècle.

In this brief comment on Chandran Kukathas’s “Ethical Pluralism from a Classical Liberal Perspective,” I present the other side of the liberal dialogue on diversity. It sets out the responses of deliberative liberals to the difficulties of pluralism where these responses are different from those presented by Kukathas’s liberals. One of the best examples of this other strand of classical liberalism today is John Rawls’s “political liberalism,” a view of liberalism founded on the ideal of the exchange of public reasons among ethically plural citizens. Of course, both types of liberals share a great deal and most are members of both schools under some descriptions. However, important differences remain and their continuous contestation within liberalism make this a living and evolving tradition. The aim of this comment is thus to supplement Kukathas’s excellent account by bringing in these other liberal voices where they dissent from the views of the minimal liberals on pluralism.

During the last forty years, the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas, of the British Commonwealth, and of other countries colonized by Europeans over the last five hundred years have demanded that their forms of property and government be recognized in international law and in the constitutional law of their countries. This broad movement of 250 million Aboriginal people has involved court cases, parliamentary politics, constitutional amendments, the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the development of an international law of Aboriginal peoples, and countless nonviolent and violent actions in defense of Aboriginal systems of property and cultures. The Aboriginal peoples of New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have been at the forefront of the movement, and it is in these countries that the greatest legal recognition has been achieved