-
84Ability and responsibility for omissionsPhilosophical Studies 73 (2-3). 1994.Most philosophers now accept that an agent may be responsible for an action even though she could not have acted otherwise. However, many who accept such a view about responsibility for actions nevertheless maintain that, when it comes to omissions, an agent is responsible only if she could have done what she omitted to do. If this Principle of Possible Action (PPA), as it is sometimes called, is correct, then there is an important asymmetry between what is required for responsibility for action…Read more
-
386Libertarian Accounts of Free WillOxford University Press USA. 2003.This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal …Read more
-
107Free choice, effort, and wanting morePhilosophical Explorations 2 (1): 20-41. 1999.This paper examines the libertarian account of free choice advanced by Robert Kane in his recent book, The Significance of Free Will. First a rather simple libertarian view is considered, and an objection is raised against it the view fails to provide for any greater degree of agent-control than what could be available in a deterministic world. The basic differences between this simple view and Kane's account are the requirements, on the latter, of efforts of will and of an agent's wanting more …Read more
-
76The appearance of freedomPhilosophical Explorations 10 (1). 2007.This paper develops three points in response to Habermas's ?The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will.? First, while Habermas nicely characterizes the appearance of freedom, he misconstrues its connections to deliberate agency, responsibility, and our justificatory practice. Second, Habermas's discussion largely overlooks grave conceptual challenges to our idea of freedom, challenges more fundamental than those posed by naturalism. Finally, a physicalist view of oursel…Read more
-
263Contrastive rational explanation of free choicePhilosophical Quarterly 46 (183): 185-201. 1996.A contrastive rational explanation of a choice cites a reason why the agent made that choice rather than, say, making a different choice, or rather than making no choice at all. It is often said that if, as libertarians maintain, free choices are undetermined by prior events, then it is not possible to provide contrastive rational explanations of them. Alternatively, it is sometimes said that while non-causal contrastive rational explanation of such a choice might be possible, causal contrastive…Read more
-
162Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe (review)Mind 119 (475): 820-823. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
-
76A Principle of Rational Explanation?Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 1-12. 1992.This paper addresses an argument from Richard Double to the effect that any libertarian account of free will must attribute to human action a kind of rationality that is impossible. Double's argument relies on an alleged principle of rational explanation. Here it is argued that the proposed principle is false, and hence that Double has failed to show that libertarianism has any problem with rationality. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to how the sort of rationality in question is made p…Read more
-
165Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and RetributivismThe Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3): 121-137. 2016.This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling of guilt is a kind of m…Read more
-
114Abilities (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2): 451-458. 2013.The paper is a contribution to a symposium on Dana Nelkin's MAKING SENSE OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY. Nelkin advances accounts of moral freedom--the freedom required for moral responsibility--and deliberative freedom--the freedom that any rational deliberator must believe in. She argues that the two come to fundamentally the same thing. I raise doubt about this claim, and also about whether the kind of ability that Nelkin characterizes suffices for responsibility in all cases.
-
144Intrinsic finksPhilosophical Quarterly 58 (232). 2008.Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it.
-
17Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of DesirePacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1): 1-11. 1994.
-
66Reflections on an Argument from LuckPhilosophical Topics 32 (1-2): 47-64. 2004.An argument from luck purports to show than an undetermined action cannot be a free action. I examine here an argument of this sort recently set out by Alfred Mele. Mele does not endorse the argument; rather, he claims, it constitutes a serious challenge to standard libertarian accounts of free will, and he has some proposals about how the challenge can be met. I offer an assessment of Mele's proposals and some observations on the strengths and weaknesses of the argument for luck.
-
149Because She Wanted ToThe Journal of Ethics 14 (1): 27-35. 2010.Carl Ginet has advanced an account of action explanation on which actions can be entirely uncaused and action explanations need not cite causal factors. Several objections have been raised against this view, and Ginet has recently defended the account. Here it is argued that Ginet’s defense fails to come to grips with the chief problems faced by his view.
-
203Opposing powersPhilosophical Studies 149 (2). 2010.A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from…Read more
-
216Agent causation and event causation in the production of free actionPhilosophical Topics 24 (2): 19-48. 1996.
-
65Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibilityPhilosophical Studies 98 (2): 153-174. 2000.
-
3Alternatives for LibertariansIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition, . pp. 329-48. 2011.This essay examines several varieties of libertarian accounts of free will. Some require free actions to be uncaused, some require agent causation, and some require non-deterministic event causation. Difficulties are raised for all of these varieties
-
44Freedom of the WillIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2002.This chapter in the Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind surveys issues concerning free will. Topics include the compatibility question, compatibilist accounts, and libertarian accounts of free will
-
31The Metaphysics of Free Will (review)Philosophical Review 106 (3): 450-453. 1997.The first, the Transfer Version, employs an inference principle concerning the transfer of one's powerlessness with respect to certain facts. The principle says, roughly, "If a person is powerless over one thing, and powerless over that thing's leading to another, then the person is powerless over the second thing". The key premises are the Fixity of the Past and the Fixity of the Laws. Fischer defends the transfer principle against objections that have been raised by Anthony Kenny and Michael S…Read more
-
11Deliberation and Beliefs About one's AbilitiesPacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2): 101-113. 1992.
APA Eastern Division
Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Free Will |
Moral Responsibility |
Dispositions and Powers |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Normative Ethics |