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Randolph Clarke

Florida State University
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 More details
  • Florida State University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD
APA Eastern Division
Email (login required)
Homepage
Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
0000-0002-3909-6068
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action
Free Will
Moral Responsibility
Dispositions and Powers
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (101)
  •  157
    Abilities (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2): 451-458. 2013.
    The paper is a contribution to a symposium on Dana Nelkin's MAKING SENSE OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY. Nelkin advances accounts of moral freedom--the freedom required for moral responsibility--and deliberative freedom--the freedom that any rational deliberator must believe in. She argues that the two come to fundamentally the same thing. I raise doubt about this claim, and also about whether the kind of ability that Nelkin characterizes suffices for responsibility in all cases.
    Free Will and ResponsibilityDeliberationFree Will, MiscAlternative Possibilities
  •  485
    Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will
    with Justin Capes
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
    IncompatibilismLibertarianism about Free Will
  •  76
    Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1): 1-11. 1994.
    Desire and Motivation
  •  218
    Because She Wanted To
    The Journal of Ethics 14 (1): 27-35. 2010.
    Carl Ginet has advanced an account of action explanation on which actions can be entirely uncaused and action explanations need not cite causal factors. Several objections have been raised against this view, and Ginet has recently defended the account. Here it is argued that Ginet’s defense fails to come to grips with the chief problems faced by his view.
    Value TheoryReasons and CausesAction Theory, MiscellaneousNoncausal Theories of ActionCausal Theory …Read more
    Value TheoryReasons and CausesAction Theory, MiscellaneousNoncausal Theories of ActionCausal Theory of ActionIntentional Action
  •  120
    The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (review)
    with John Martin Fischer
    Philosophical Review 106 (3): 450. 1997.
    The first, the Transfer Version, employs an inference principle concerning the transfer of one's powerlessness with respect to certain facts. The principle says, roughly, "If a person is powerless over one thing, and powerless over that thing's leading to another, then the person is powerless over the second thing". The key premises are the Fixity of the Past and the Fixity of the Laws. Fischer defends the transfer principle against objections that have been raised by Anthony Kenny and Michael S…Read more
    The first, the Transfer Version, employs an inference principle concerning the transfer of one's powerlessness with respect to certain facts. The principle says, roughly, "If a person is powerless over one thing, and powerless over that thing's leading to another, then the person is powerless over the second thing". The key premises are the Fixity of the Past and the Fixity of the Laws. Fischer defends the transfer principle against objections that have been raised by Anthony Kenny and Michael Slote.
    Free Will and ResponsibilitySemi-Compatibilism
  •  371
    Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action
    Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 19-48. 1996.
    Causal Theory of ActionAgent Causation
  •  246
    Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe (review)
    Mind 119 (475): 820-823. 2010.
    No abstract is available for this citation
    Volitional Theories of ActionAgent CausationThe Structure of ActionConsciousness of ActionReasons an…Read more
    Volitional Theories of ActionAgent CausationThe Structure of ActionConsciousness of ActionReasons and CausesMental Causation, Misc
  •  237
    Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism
    The Journal of Ethics 20 (1): 121-137. 2016.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling of guilt is a kind of m…Read more
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling of guilt is a kind of moral propriety of that response, and it is a matter of justice. If the minimal desert thesis is correct, then it is in some respect good that one who is blameworthy feel guilty—there is some justice in that state of affairs. But if retributivism concerns the justification of punishment, the minimal desert thesis is not retributivist. Its plausibility nevertheless raises doubt about whether, as some have argued, there are senses of moral responsibility that are not desert-entailing.
    Value TheoryFree Will and Responsibility
  •  3
    Alternatives for Libertarians
    In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press. pp. 329-48. 2011.
    This essay examines several varieties of libertarian accounts of free will. Some require free actions to be uncaused, some require agent causation, and some require non-deterministic event causation. Difficulties are raised for all of these varieties.
    Agent CausationLibertarianism about Free WillFree Will Skepticism
  •  266
    Free will and the conditions of moral responsibility
    Philosophical Studies 66 (1): 53-72. 1992.
    Free Will and Responsibility
  •  63
    Deliberation and Beliefs About one's Abilities
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2): 101-113. 1992.
    Motivation and WillDeliberation
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