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154Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argumentPhilosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.I have presented a Frankfurt-style argument (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003) against the requirement of robust alternative possibilities for moral responsibility that features an example, Tax Evasion , in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for a decision, has no robust alternative possibilities, and is clearly not causally determined to make the decision. Here I revise the criterion for robustness in response to suggestions by Dana Nelkin, Jonathan Vance, and Kevin Timpe, and I respond…Read more
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141Kant on justification in transcendental philosophySynthese 85 (1). 1990.Kant''s claim that the justification of transcendental philosophy is a priori is puzzling because it should be consistent with (1) his general restriction on the justification of knowledge, that intuitions must play a role in the justification of all nondegenerate knowledge, with (2) the implausibility of a priori intuitions being the only ones on which transcendental philosophy is founded, and with (3) his professed view that transcendental philosophy is not analytic. I argue that this puzzle c…Read more
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140Russellian Monism and Structuralism About PhysicsErkenntnis 88 (4): 1409-1428. 2023.It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and to the rest of concrete reality, than spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. But the latter claim supports only a conditional claim about physics: _if_ structuralism about physics is true, then there i…Read more
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140Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in LifeIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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137Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta- Problem of ConsciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 182-193. 2019.Proposed is a two-factor explanation for our resistance to illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. The first is that we lack, and can't easily imagine, ways of checking the accuracy of introspective phenomenal representation. The second is that illusions of phenomenal consciousness would themselves appear to be phenomenally conscious. The illusionist's defence is to apply illusionism to illusions of consciousness, but the result, even if formally coherent, resists imaginative conception.
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132Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of PhysicalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 715-727. 2013.Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism has three parts. The first (Chapters 1–4) develops a response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism, one that features the open possibility that introspective representations represent mental properties as having features they actually lack. The second part (Chapters 5 and 6) proposes a physicalist version of a Russellian Monist answer to these arguments, the core of which is that currently unknown intrinsic physical prop…Read more
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130Defending hard incompatibilism againIn Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on free will and moral responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 1--33. 2008.
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128On Alfred Mele's free will and luckPhilosophical Explorations 10 (2). 2007.I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism
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128Free Will Skepticism and Criminal PunishmentIn Thomas A. Nadelhoffer (ed.), The Future of Punishment, Oup Usa. pp. 49. 2013.
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126Consciousness and the Prospects of PhysicalismOxford University Press. 2011.In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these propert…Read more
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126Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal ConsciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 172-185. 2016.The role of a functionalist account of phenomenal properties in Keith Frankish's illusionist position results in two issues for his view. The first concerns the ontological status of illusions of phenomenality. Illusionists are committed to their existence, and these illusions would appear to have phenomenal features. Frankish argues that functionalism about phenomenal properties yields a response, but I contend that it doesn't, and that instead the illusionist's basic account of phenomenal prop…Read more
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119Self-understanding in Kant's transcendental deductionSynthese 103 (1). 1995.I argue that §§15–20 of the B-Deduction contain two independent arguments for the applicability of a priori concepts, the first an argument from above, the second an argument from below. The core of the first argument is §16's explanation of our consciousness of subject-identity across self-attributions, while the focus of the second is §18's account of universality and necessity in our experience. I conclude that the B-Deduction comprises powerful strategies for establishing its intended conclu…Read more
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117Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1Philosophical Issues 22 (1): 298-315. 2012.
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116Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic PropertiesIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 40. 2013.
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114Alternative possibilities and causal historiesPhilosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 119-138. 2000.
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110Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalistSynthese 88 (September): 341-58. 1991.According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the conse…Read more
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105Undivided Forward-Looking Moral ResponsibilityThe Monist 104 (4): 484-497. 2021.This article sets out a forward-looking account of moral responsibility on which the ground-level practice is directly sensitive to aims such as moral formation and reconciliation, and is not subject to a barrier between tiers. On the contrasting two-tier accounts defended by Daniel Dennett and Manuel Vargas, the ground-level practice features backward-looking, desert-invoking justifications that are in turn justified by forward-looking considerations at the higher tier. The concern raised for t…Read more
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99Response to Dennett on Free Will SkepticismRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3): 259-265. 2017.: What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the supposition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our actions. But I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action require…Read more
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96Theological Determinism and Divine ProvidenceIn Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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92On Fischer’s Our Stories (review)Philosophical Studies 158 (3): 523-528. 2012.On Fischer’s Our Stories Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9670-5 Authors Derk Pereboom, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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88Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General DeterrenceNeuroethics 13 (1): 87-97. 2018.The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributive justification for punishment; does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized the quarantine ana…Read more
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88Reasons-responsiveness, alternative possibilities, and manipulation arguments against compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer's my wayPhilosophical Books 47 (3): 198-212. 2006.
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84On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free WillPhilosophical Studies 175 (6): 1535-1543. 2018.In this article I review the core elements of Carolina Sartorio’s actual causal sequence account of free will and moral responsibility, and propose two revisions. First, I suggest replacing the contested notion of absence causation by the relatively uncontroversial notion of causal explanation by absences. Second, I propose retaining explanation by unreduced dispositions, of which Sartorio appears to be wary. I then set out a response to her critical treatment of manipulation arguments against c…Read more
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84Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Randolph Clarke) (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 269-272. 2007.
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83Kant's Transcendental ArgumentsIn Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Metaphysics Research Lab. 2014.Among Immanuel Kant's most influential contributionsto philosophy is his development of the transcendental argument. InKant's conception, an argument of this kind begins with a compellingpremise about our thought, experience, or knowledge, and then reasonsto a conclusion that is a substantive and unobvious presupposition andnecessary condition of this premise. The crucial steps in thisreasoning are claims to the effect that a subconclusion or conclusionis a presupposition and necessary condition…Read more
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79Kant on God, Evil, and TeleologyFaith and Philosophy 13 (4): 508-533. 1996.In his mature period Kant maintained that human beings have never devised a theory that shows how the existence of God is compatible with the evil that actually exists. But he also held that an argument could be developed that we human beings might well not have the cognitive capacity to understand the relation between God and the world, and that therefore the existence of God might nevertheless be compatible with the evil that exists. At the core of Kant’s position lies the claim that God’s rel…Read more
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75Conceptual structure and the individuation of contentPhilosophical Perspectives 9 401-428. 1995.Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.1 In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addit…Read more
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73The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2022.The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipate…Read more
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73Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne BakerPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 753-764. 2013.
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17th/18th Century Philosophy |