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58Doğal Teoloji ve Doğal Din (Stanford Felsefe Ansiklopedisi)Öncül Analitik Felsefe Dergisi. 2024.“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya t…Read more
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Four Views on Free Will, Second Edition (2nd ed.)John Wiley & Sons. 2024.Four Views on Free Will is a robust and careful debate about free will, how it interacts with determinism and indeterminism, and whether we have it or not. Providing the most up-to-date account of four major positions in the free will debate, the second edition of this classic text presents the opposing perspectives of renowned philosophers John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Substantially revised throughout, this new volume contains eight in-depth chapters, almos…Read more
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Retributivism and the relevance of metaphysics to practiceIn Taylor W. Cyr, Andrew Law & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Value: Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer, Routledge. 2023.
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48Natural Theology and Natural ReligionStanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. 2020.The term “natural religion” is sometimes taken to refer to a pantheistic doctrine according to which nature itself is divine. “Natural theology”, by contrast, originally referred to (and still sometimes refers to)[1] the project of arguing for the existence of God on the basis of observed natural facts. In contemporary philosophy, however, both “natural religion” and “natural theology” typically refer to the project of using all of the cognitive faculties that are “natural” to human beings—reaso…Read more
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9Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityIn Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Blackwell. 2016.The chapter begins by introducing the problem of free will and moral responsibility and the standard terminology used to frame it in the philosophical context. It turns to the contributions of experimental philosophy and the prospects for the use of this methodology in the area. People believe that experimental philosophy is relevant to the traditional debates. The chapter discusses an error theory for incompatibilist intuitions proposed by Eddy nahmias and colleagues, and the role that empirica…Read more
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5Early Modern Philosophical Theology on the ContinentIn Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper & Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Works cited.
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10A Defense Without Free WillIn Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard‐Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, Wiley. 2013.This chapter explores the prospects that skeptics about free will have for addressing the problem of evil. I argue that skeptics have available many of the resources employed by antiskeptics about free will, and that the responses that involve an essential appeal to free will are not especially powerful. As a result, the theist who is a free will skeptic is not at a significant disadvantage in coping with the problem of evil.
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88Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Randolph Clarke) (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 269-272. 2007.
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Free will skepticism and prevention of crimeIn Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice, Cambridge University Press. 2019.
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Constitution, non-reductionism, and emergenceIn Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker, Routledge. 2020.
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1094Moral Responsibility ReconsideredCambridge University Press. 2022.This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of…Read more
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29Wrongdoing and the Moral EmotionsOxford University Press. 2021.Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 asks how we might conceive of blame without retribution, and proposes an account of blame as moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as the moral reform of the wrongdoer and reconciliatio…Read more
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74Review of Why Free Will is Real, Christian List, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019 (review)Criminal Law and Philosophy 17 (1): 229-234. 2022.
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76The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2022.The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipate…Read more
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111Undivided Forward-Looking Moral ResponsibilityThe Monist 104 (4): 484-497. 2021.This article sets out a forward-looking account of moral responsibility on which the ground-level practice is directly sensitive to aims such as moral formation and reconciliation, and is not subject to a barrier between tiers. On the contrasting two-tier accounts defended by Daniel Dennett and Manuel Vargas, the ground-level practice features backward-looking, desert-invoking justifications that are in turn justified by forward-looking considerations at the higher tier. The concern raised for t…Read more
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144Russellian Monism and Structuralism About PhysicsErkenntnis 88 (4): 1409-1428. 2023.It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and to the rest of concrete reality, than spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. But the latter claim supports only a conditional claim about physics: _if_ structuralism about physics is true, then there i…Read more
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834A Non-Punitive Alternative to PunishmentIn Farah Focquaert, Bruce Waller & Elizabeth Shaw (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy and Science of Punishment, Routledge. 2020.
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1323Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: An OverviewIn Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-26. 2019.
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423Justice Without Retribution: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Stakeholder Views and Practical ImplicationsNeuroethics 13 (1): 1-3. 2018.Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. T…Read more
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34Criminal Punishment and Free WillIn David Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 63-76. 2018.This chapter examines the restrictions on justification of punishment that result from the claim that human beings lack freedom of the will. The variety of free will at issue is the control in action required for the agent to basically deserve to be blamed or punished. If we lack such free will, the classical retributive justification is undermined. Furthermore, if we lack such free will, one justification for using criminals as means for the purpose of general deterrence is also threatened. Sin…Read more
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138Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta- Problem of ConsciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 182-193. 2019.Proposed is a two-factor explanation for our resistance to illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. The first is that we lack, and can't easily imagine, ways of checking the accuracy of introspective phenomenal representation. The second is that illusions of phenomenal consciousness would themselves appear to be phenomenally conscious. The illusionist's defence is to apply illusionism to illusions of consciousness, but the result, even if formally coherent, resists imaginative conception.
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128Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal ConsciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 172-185. 2016.The role of a functionalist account of phenomenal properties in Keith Frankish's illusionist position results in two issues for his view. The first concerns the ontological status of illusions of phenomenality. Illusionists are committed to their existence, and these illusions would appear to have phenomenal features. Frankish argues that functionalism about phenomenal properties yields a response, but I contend that it doesn't, and that instead the illusionist's basic account of phenomenal prop…Read more
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69What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?The Journal of Ethics 23 (3): 257-264. 2019.Contrary to what I have contended, Michael McKenna argues that basic desert does not have an essential role in the free will debate. On his alternative construal, what is central is whether our practice of holding morally responsible, and blaming in particular, can be justified, and what notion of free will is required for that justification. Notions distinct from basic desert can ground our practice, and so the free will debate is independent of basic desert. Here I argue that the one best cand…Read more
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37Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2019.'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-calle…Read more
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37Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and CrimesCriminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3): 439-454. 2019.In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros argues that wrongdoers acquire special duties to those they’ve wronged, and from there he generates wrongdoers’ duties to contribute to general deterrence by being punished. In support, he contends that my manipulation argument against compatibilism fails to show that causal determination is incompatible with the proposed duties wrongdoers owe to those they’ve wronged. I respond that I did not intend my manipulation argument to rule out a sense of moral respon…Read more
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89Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General DeterrenceNeuroethics 13 (1): 87-97. 2018.The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributive justification for punishment; does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized the quarantine ana…Read more
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28Review of Kevin Timpe’s Free Will in Philosophical Theology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1. 2015.
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |