-
15
-
51Consciousness and introspective inaccuracyIn Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the good: themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
167Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 315-29. 1994.
-
17
-
12Early Modern Philosophical TheologyIn Philip Quinn & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell. 1996.
-
10Book Review. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Randolph Clarke. (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 269-72. 2007.
-
63Free Will: A Contemporary IntroductionRoutledge. 2014.If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do? The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral judgments we make of others, and they will infor…Read more
-
275Kant's theory of causation and its eighteenth-century German backgroundPhilosophical Review 119 (4): 565-591. 2010.This critical notice highlights the important contributions that Eric Watkins's writings have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant's theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it d…Read more
-
197A hard-line reply to the multiple-case manipulation argumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 160-170. 2008.No Abstract
-
124Consciousness and the Prospects of PhysicalismOxford University Press. 2011.In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these propert…Read more
-
7A Compatibilist Account of the Beliefs Required for Rational DeliberationThe Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4): 287-306. 2008.A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate wi…Read more
-
75Conceptual structure and the individuation of contentPhilosophical Perspectives 9 401-428. 1995.Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.1 In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addit…Read more
-
11Book ReviewsJohn Martin Fischer,. My Way.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 260. $45.00Ethics 117 (4): 754-757. 2007.
-
113Alternative possibilities and causal historiesPhilosopical Perspectives 14 (s14): 119-138. 2000.
-
21Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of IntrospectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 315-329. 1994.
-
25A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 142-159. 2008.
-
48Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityLexington Books. 2013.Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications
-
6And Divine ProvidenceIn Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. pp. 262. 2011.
-
88Reasons-responsiveness, alternative possibilities, and manipulation arguments against compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer's my wayPhilosophical Books 47 (3): 198-212. 2006.
-
49Existentialism: Basic Writings (edited book)Hackett Publishing Company. 2001."An invaluable source for undergraduate courses in continental philosophy." --Giovanna Borradori, Vassar College
-
27Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will:The Significance of Free WillEthics 110 (2): 426-430. 2000.
-
1236Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityIn Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Blackwell. pp. 142-57. 2016.Examines the relevance of empirical studies of responsibility judgments for traditional philosophical concerns about free will and moral responsibility. We argue that experimental philosophy is relevant to the traditional debates, but that setting up experiments and interpreting data in just the right way is no less difficult than negotiating traditional philosophical arguments. Both routes are valuable, but so far neither promises a way to secure significant agreement among the competing partie…Read more
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |