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George Graham

Georgia State University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    97
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  •  Events
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 More details
  • Georgia State University
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Brandeis University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1975
Homepage
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (97)
  •  63
    Psychopathology, Freedom, and the Experience of Externality
    Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 159-182. 1996.
    Psychiatric EthicsPsychopathologyPhilosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc
  •  93
    Mind, brain, world
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (3): 223-225. 1999.
    Mind-Body Problem, GeneralPhilosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, MiscMental Illness
  •  155
    Minding your p's and q's: Pain and sensible qualities
    with G. Lynn Stephens
    Noûs 21 (3): 395-405. 1987.
    Pain
  •  141
    Doing Something Intentionally and Moral Responsibility
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.
    The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive eutha…Read more
    The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and to the exoneration of God for the production of evil. In particular, I shall try to show, first, that the American Medical Association's recent attempt to distinguish between active and passive euthanasia is seriously defective. Second, I shall try to show that a popular version of the so-called Free Will Defense of God for Evil is also seriously defective.
    Control and Responsibility
  •  252
    In defense of southern fundamentalism
    with Terence Horgan
    Philosophical Studies 62 (2): 107-134. 1991.
    Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes
  •  115
    A Companion to Cognitive Science (edited book)
    with William Bechtel
    Blackwell. 1998.
    Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9.…Read more
    Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank Yates and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki.
    Theories of Color, Misc
  •  99
    Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy
    with Terry Horgan
    Philosophical Issues 5. 1994.
  •  76
    Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents
    with Terence Horgan
    In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 89--107. 2008.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessAspects of ConsciousnessConsciousness and ContentTheories of Consciousnes…Read more
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessAspects of ConsciousnessConsciousness and ContentTheories of Consciousness
  •  1
    On what is good: A study of BF Skinner's operant behaviorist view
    Behaviorism 5 (2): 97-112. 1977.
    BehaviorismValues and Norms
  •  6
    The delusional stance
    with G. Lynn Stephens
    In M. Chung, K. William M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia, Oxford University Press. 2005.
    DelusionsSchizophrenia
  •  195
    Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorder
    Philosophical Explorations 2 (3): 159-174. 1999.
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of mu…Read more
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple personalities
    Dissociative Identity Disorder
  •  107
    Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy
    with Terry Horgan
    In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, De Gruyter. pp. 321-344. 2012.
    Phenomenal IntentionalityThe Basis of Meaning, MiscKripkenstein on Meaning
  •  10
    Behaviorism: The next generation
    with Peter Killeen
    Behaviorism 13 (1): 1-2. 1985.
    Behaviorism
  •  90
    Ullin Thomas place: 24 october 1924–2 january 2000 (review)
    Brain and Mind 1 (2): 181-182. 2000.
    Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
  •  49
    Book reviews (review)
    with Mark Rollins, Robert L. Arrington, and Dan D. Crawford
    Philosophical Psychology 6 (4): 469-483. 1993.
    Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues Brian Beakley & Peter Ludlow, 1992 Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press xvi + 433pp, notes, index, US$19.95, $39.95Principles of Mental Imagery Ronald A. Finke MIT Press/A Bradford Book 179pp. $19.95The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind Cora Diamond, 1991 Cambridge, Mass, and London, MIT Press 396pp with index. $32.50Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture E. Thomas Lawson & Robert N. Mccauley 1990 Cambrid…Read more
    Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues Brian Beakley & Peter Ludlow, 1992 Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press xvi + 433pp, notes, index, US$19.95, $39.95Principles of Mental Imagery Ronald A. Finke MIT Press/A Bradford Book 179pp. $19.95The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind Cora Diamond, 1991 Cambridge, Mass, and London, MIT Press 396pp with index. $32.50Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture E. Thomas Lawson & Robert N. Mccauley 1990 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 184 pp $42.50.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • Spartans and Behaviorists
    Behavior and Philosophy 10 (2): 21. 1982.
  •  2
    Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
    with Terence Horgan and John Tienson
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 512--537. 2007.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  256
    Melancholic epistemology
    Synthese 82 (3): 399-422. 1990.
      Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or…Read more
      Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or unjustified, warranted or unwarranted. I argue that the effort of Aaron Beck to show that depressive reasoning is necessarily illogical and distorted is flawed. I identify an essential characteristic of that depression which is a mental illness. Finally, I describe the potential of depression to provide credal contact with important truths
    Epistemology, MiscMoodsThe Body
  •  10
    Reconceiving delusions
    with G. Lynn Stephens
    International Review of Psychiatry 16 236-241. 2004.
    Delusions
  •  70
    Dismantling the Memory Machine: A Philosophical Investigation of Machine Theories of Memory. By Howard A. Bursen (review)
    Modern Schoolman 57 (3): 269-270. 1980.
    Issues in PsychologyPhilosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  3
    Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentation
    with Terence E. Horgan and John L. Tienson
    In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 41-61. 2006.
    Self-Representational Theories of ConsciousnessKnowledge of ConsciousnessCartesian SkepticismVarieti…Read more
    Self-Representational Theories of ConsciousnessKnowledge of ConsciousnessCartesian SkepticismVarieties of Skepticism, MiscSkepticism, Misc
  •  126
    Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists?
    with G. Lynn Stephens
    American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1): 73-80. 1985.
    Functionalism and QualiaLocation of Pain
  •  97
    Self-Consciousness, Psychopathology, and Realism about the Self
    Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2). 1999.
    PsychopathologySelf-Consciousness in PsychologySelf-Consciousness in Experience
  •  60
    Review of Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (5). 2002.
    Theories of Emotion, Misc
  •  87
    Persons and time
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (3): 309-315. 1977.
    Temporal Experience, Misc
  •  110
    Ultimate differences
    with G. Lynn Stephens
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4): 698-699. 1995.
    Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  106
    Guilty consciousness
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 255-256. 1995.
    Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  209
    The phenomenology of first-person agency
    with Terence E. Horgan and John L. Tienson
    In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Imprint Academic. pp. 323. 2003.
    Consciousness of Action
  •  168
    Consciousness and intentionality
    with Terence E. Horgan and John L. Tienson
    In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 468--484. 2008.
    Phenomenal IntentionalityConsciousness and Intentionality
  •  1
    William G. Lycan, Consciousness (review)
    Philosophy in Review 9 155-158. 1989.
    Theories of Consciousness
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