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63Psychopathology, Freedom, and the Experience of ExternalityPhilosophical Topics 24 (2): 159-182. 1996.
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141Doing Something Intentionally and Moral ResponsibilityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive eutha…Read more
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115A Companion to Cognitive Science (edited book)Blackwell. 1998.Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9.…Read more
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76Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and DiscontentsIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 89--107. 2008.
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1On what is good: A study of BF Skinner's operant behaviorist viewBehaviorism 5 (2): 97-112. 1977.
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6The delusional stanceIn M. Chung, K. William M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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195Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorderPhilosophical Explorations 2 (3): 159-174. 1999.This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of mu…Read more
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107Phenomenal Intentionality and Content DeterminacyIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, De Gruyter. pp. 321-344. 2012.
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49Book reviews (review)Philosophical Psychology 6 (4): 469-483. 1993.Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues Brian Beakley & Peter Ludlow, 1992 Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press xvi + 433pp, notes, index, US$19.95, $39.95Principles of Mental Imagery Ronald A. Finke MIT Press/A Bradford Book 179pp. $19.95The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind Cora Diamond, 1991 Cambridge, Mass, and London, MIT Press 396pp with index. $32.50Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture E. Thomas Lawson & Robert N. Mccauley 1990 Cambrid…Read more
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2Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the MindIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 512--537. 2007.
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256Melancholic epistemologySynthese 82 (3): 399-422. 1990.Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or…Read more
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70Dismantling the Memory Machine: A Philosophical Investigation of Machine Theories of Memory. By Howard A. Bursen (review)Modern Schoolman 57 (3): 269-270. 1980.
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3Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentationIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 41-61. 2006.
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126Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists?American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1): 73-80. 1985.
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97Self-Consciousness, Psychopathology, and Realism about the SelfAnthropology and Philosophy 3 (2). 1999.
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60Review of Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (5). 2002.
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110Ultimate differencesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4): 698-699. 1995.Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
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106Guilty consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 255-256. 1995.Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
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209The phenomenology of first-person agencyIn Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Imprint Academic. pp. 323. 2003.
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168Consciousness and intentionalityIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 468--484. 2008.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |