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A companion to cognitive scienceIn Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell. 1996.
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30Philosophical PsychopathologyMIT Press. 1994.A benchmark volume for an emerging field where mental disorders serve as the springboard for philosophical insights.
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2Extreme self-denialIn M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Springer. 2007.
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62Sensations and grain processesIn Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness, John Benjamins. 1998.
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26Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. By Michael E. Levin (review)Modern Schoolman 59 (4): 301-302. 1982.
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21Explanation and Power: The Control of Human Behavior. By Morse Peckham (review)Modern Schoolman 57 (2): 168-171. 1980.
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129Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorderPhilosophical Explorations 2 (3): 159-174. 1999.This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of mu…Read more
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Self-ascription: Thought insertionIn Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, Oxford University Press. pp. 89. 2004.
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18Review of grant Gillett, Subjectivity and Being Somebody: Human Identity and Neuroethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5). 2009.
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36Reconcevoir le délirePhilosophiques 33 (1): 183-195. 2006.Les délires sont des composantes cruciales de nombreux troubles psychiques, surtout la schizophrénie. Que sont les délires? Selon l’opinion courante, il s’agit d’un type de croyance, plus précisément, une croyance pathologique. Malheureusement, l’opinion courante ne correspond pas rigoureusement, dans tous les cas, à la pratique clinique, où l’expression « délire » est souvent appliquée à des états qui ne sont pas des croyances. Nous examinons les raisons pour lesquelles des états qui ne sont pa…Read more
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1Mind and mineIn George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology, Mit Press. 1994.
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393Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vatIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. 2004.
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74When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted ThoughtsMIT Press. 2000.An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness."
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25Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and PsychiatryOxford University Press. 2006.Psychiatry is unique in medicine in being on the border between science and the humanities. Science provides insight into the 'causes' of a problem, enabling us to formulate an 'explanation', while the humanities provide insight into its 'meanings' and helps with our 'understanding'. The new interdisciplinary field of 'philosophy of psychiatry' has developed to explore the range of issues relevant to this border country. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry is a unique textbook which…Read more
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28More on the Goodness of SkinnerBehavior and Philosophy 11 (1): 45. 1983.Discusses B. F. Skinner's proposal in Beyond Freedom and Dignity that reinforcing stimuli are important in the production and modification of value talk. The argument that the view that values are reinforcing leads to moral nihilism is discussed. It is concluded that moral standards can be objective without being universally deployable, and that Skinnerian morality is objective. It shows that certain actions are morally appropriate, others morally wrong. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, a…Read more
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12Commentary on Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental UnityPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2): 115-116. 1994.
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47Guilty consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 255-256. 1995.Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |