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A companion to cognitive scienceIn Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell. 1996.
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11Philosophical PsychopathologyMIT Press. 1994.A benchmark volume for an emerging field where mental disorders serve as the springboard for philosophical insights.
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2Extreme self-denialIn M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Springer. 2007.
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3Sensations and grain processesIn Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness, John Benjamins. 1998.
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26Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. By Michael E. Levin (review)Modern Schoolman 59 (4): 301-302. 1982.
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1Explanation and Power: The Control of Human Behavior. By Morse Peckham (review)Modern Schoolman 57 (2): 168-171. 1980.
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33Dissociation, self-attribution, and redescriptionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 719-719. 1994.
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Self-ascription: Thought insertionIn Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, Oxford University Press. pp. 89. 2004.
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12Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists?American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1): 73-80. 1985.
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2Review of grant Gillett, Subjectivity and Being Somebody: Human Identity and Neuroethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5). 2009.
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18Reconcevoir le délirePhilosophiques 33 (1): 183-195. 2006.Les délires sont des composantes cruciales de nombreux troubles psychiques, surtout la schizophrénie. Que sont les délires? Selon l’opinion courante, il s’agit d’un type de croyance, plus précisément, une croyance pathologique. Malheureusement, l’opinion courante ne correspond pas rigoureusement, dans tous les cas, à la pratique clinique, où l’expression « délire » est souvent appliquée à des états qui ne sont pas des croyances. Nous examinons les raisons pour lesquelles des états qui ne sont pa…Read more
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3Psychopathology, Freedom, and the Experience of ExternalityPhilosophical Topics 24 (2): 159-182. 1996.
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13Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vatIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. 2004.
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12Consciousness and intentionalityIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 468--484. 2007.
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4When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted ThoughtsMIT Press. 2000.An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness."
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4In and Out of MePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4): 323-326. 2004.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In and Out of MeGeorge Graham (bio)An important role in many recent philosophical analyses of personal well-being and psychological health has been played by a principle I call the "the principle of responsible innerness." This principle states that a person is psychologically healthy and well only if she or he acts in critical situations on preferences and desires that are responsibly in her or him rather than being merely in her or…Read more
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3Commentary on Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental UnityPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2): 115-116. 1994.
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1On what is good: A study of BF Skinner's operant behaviorist viewBehaviorism 5 (2): 97-112. 1977.
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14Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U.T. Place (edited book)Oup Usa. 2004.This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighbouring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness.
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16Doing Something Intentionally and Moral ResponsibilityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive eutha…Read more
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9Are the Deluded Believers? Are Philosophers Among the Deluded?Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 337-339. 2010.Are delusions best understood as a species of belief? Can I be deluded that p without believing that p? Because delusion is a clinical symptom, there are conflicting data at every turn. Perhaps it is best to think of delusions as beliefs not because they necessarily are beliefs, but because doing so helps patients. If one thinks that “denying that delusions are beliefs” means denying deluded patients “a voice in their own treatment” and that this would cut them off from alternative and healthier…Read more
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |